Saving the Marketplace from Market Failure: Reorienting Marketplace Theory in the Era of AI Communicators by Schroeder, Jared
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 
Volume 28 (2019-2020) 
Issue 3 Article 5 
March 2020 
Saving the Marketplace from Market Failure: Reorienting 
Marketplace Theory in the Era of AI Communicators 
Jared Schroeder 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, European Law Commons, and the First 
Amendment Commons 
Repository Citation 
Jared Schroeder, Saving the Marketplace from Market Failure: Reorienting Marketplace Theory 
in the Era of AI Communicators, 28 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 689 (2020), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol28/iss3/5 
Copyright c 2020 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj 
SAVING THE MARKETPLACE FROM MARKET FAILURE:
REORIENTING MARKETPLACE THEORY IN THE
ERA OF AI COMMUNICATORS
Jared Schroeder*
Artificially Intelligent (AI) communicators represent a new type of actor within
public discourse. These entities have played influential roles in recent elections in the
U.S. and Europe.1 This Article examines expression rights for AI actors through the
lenses provided by the foundational assumptions of the marketplace of ideas theory
and existing free-expression-related rationales regarding non-human actors in the U.S.
and European legal systems. The Article contends that the fundamental assumptions
of the marketplace model must be revised to focus on the flow of information, the
development of truth, rather than the more Enlightenment-oriented competition of
ideas that leads to the discovery of truth. Such a shift would allow limitations on AI
that harm the flow of ideas, but otherwise protect AI expression that contributes to
democratic discourse.
INTRODUCTION
Artificially intelligent communicators represent a fundamentally new type of actor
within public discourse. Such actors—algorithms, AI agents, chatbots—are conveying
significant amounts of information in virtual spaces, as well as making decisions
about the information citizens do and do not encounter.2 Importantly, when it comes to
how we rationalize freedom of expression, these actors simply were not on the minds
of those who provided the foundational assumptions upon which we have come to
build our understandings of democratic discourse.3 Just the same, AI communicators
* Jared Schroeder is an Assistant Professor of Journalism at Southern Methodist Univer-
sity. He is the author of The Press Clause and Digital Technology’s Fourth Wave.
1 See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
2 See Efrat Nechushtai & Seth C. Lewis, What Kind of News Gatekeepers Do We Want
Machines To Be? Filter Bubbles, Fragmentation, and the Normative Dimensions of Algo-
rithmic Recommendations, 90 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 298, 298–99 (2019); Brian Resnick,
Yes, Artificial Intelligence Can Be Racist, VOX (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.vox.com/sci
ence-and-health/2019/1/23/18194717/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-ai-bias [https://perma.cc/8UH9
-BT4W]; Stefan Wojcik, 5 Things to Know About Bots on Twitter, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9,
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/09/5-things-to-know-about-bots-on
-twitter [https://perma.cc/A7CL-WVK9].
3 For examples of the types of concerns that were on the minds of the thinkers who sig-
nificantly influenced U.S. and European thought during formative periods, see JOHN LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
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690 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:689
have arrived as part of the Fourth Wave of networked communication, a wave that
is defined by increasingly meaningful interactions between humans and computer
programs.4 Our existing theoretical and legal models are relatively unprepared for
how these AI actors, which are characterized by fundamentally different natures and
characteristics than human communicators, influence societal discourse.5 This con-
cern has been particularly important since the 2016 United States presidential
election, as computer programs of varying complexity have been used to leverage
the non-physical, largely anonymous nature of online communication to increase the
frequency and salience of certain ideas.6 This concern, along with others, strikes at
the heart of marketplace theory, a tool that the U.S. Supreme Court has used to ration-
alize expansive protections for free expression for a century and European courts
have, at times, turned to as well.7 AI actors, which also capitalize on the significant
fragmentation and polarization that comes with the choice-rich nature of information
and weaker ties that individuals share online, can flood virtual spaces with certain
information and ideas, communicate threatening and hateful speech, and exploit and
mislead those who receive their messages.8 While human actors engage in these same
behaviors in virtual spaces, legal systems throughout the world have yet to resolve
whether AI entities, which vary significantly in complexity and purpose, should re-
ceive the same or similar freedom of expression safeguards as humans.
9–10 (J.W. Gough ed., 1948); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION 50 (George
H. Sabine ed., 1951); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 16
(G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950).
4 Web 1.0 was characterized by massive information searchability and availability. Web
2.0 included social media and widespread creation of user-created content. Web 3.0 involved
growing intrinsic relationships between information and knowledge. See Sareh Aghaei et al.,
Evolution of the World Wide Web: From Web 1.0 to Web 4.0, 3 INT’L J. WEB & SEMANTIC
TECH. 1, 1 (2012); Nupur Choudhury, World Wide Web and Its Journey from Web 1.0 to Web
4.0, 5 INT’L J. COMPUTER SCI. & INFO. TECHS. 8096, 8099 (2014).
5 See Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial
Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1171–72 (2016); see also Brian R. Duffy, Fundamental
Issues in Social Robotics, 6 INT’L REV. INFORMATIONAL ETHICS 31, 32–34 (2006).
6 See Alessandro Bessi & Emilio Ferrara, Social Bots Distort the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Election Online Discussion, FIRST MONDAY, Nov. 2016, at 10–11; Nathaniel Persily, The
2016 U.S. Election: Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 70 (2017).
7 For examples of the marketplace theory’s role in U.S. decisions, see Gertz v. Robert
Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring). For exam-
ples regarding the theory’s use in ECtHR decisions, see Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct.
H.R. 321, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-126635 [https://perma.cc/8U5J-5KVG]; Mouve-
ment Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 375, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng
?i=001-112165 [https://perma.cc/27NM-XN9U].
8 See Helen Norton, Robotic Speakers and Human Listeners, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1145, 1147–48 (2018); Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND.
INST. (Sept. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete
[https://perma.cc/7NDG-BGJQ].
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From involving themselves in political conversations during recent elections in
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States,9 to discussions regarding school
shootings in the United States, debates about the release of political documents, and
terror attacks in London,10 more and more complex computer programs are contribut-
ing important facts, advocating on behalf of the interests of those who programmed
them, and interjecting false and misleading information into human interactions in
virtual spaces.11 In the final days of the French presidential election in May 2017,
for example, bot-based Twitter accounts blasted out tens of thousands of negative
messages about centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron.12 Just one of these accounts
produced nearly 1,700 tweets about the French election in twenty-four hours,
highlighting crucial concerns when it comes to how we understand AI communica-
tors.13 First, they are a fundamentally global concern, with out-of-state actors often
9 See Khatya Chhor, As French Media Went Dark, Bots and Far-Right Activists Drove
#MacronLeaks, FRANCE 24 (last modified Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.france24.com/en/2017
0508-french-media-blackout-bots-far-right-activists-wikileaks-pushed-macronleaks
[https://perma.cc/9K43-DDMW]; Bence Kollanyi et al., Bots and Automation over Twitter
During the U.S. Election, PROJECT ON COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA (Nov. 17, 2016), http://
comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2016/11/Data-Memo-US-Election.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6UDK-6MCX]; Edward Malnick & Gordon Rayner, Exclusive: Labour Elec-
tion Campaign Boosted by Fake Twitter Accounts, TELEGRAPH (June 1, 2017, 10:00 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/01/exclusive-labour-election-cam paign-boosted
-fake-twitter-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/N7ST-AMMC].
10 See Hayley Dixon, Russian Bot Behind False Claim Muslim Woman Ignored Victims of
Westminster Terror Attack, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 13, 2017, 6:04 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk
/news/2017/11/13/russian-bot-behind-false-claim-muslim-woman-ignored-victims/ [https://
perma.cc/6LRB-RL68]; Erin Griffith, Pro-Gun Russian Bots Flood Twitter After Parkland
Shooting, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/pro-gun-russian-bots
-flood-twitter-after-parkland-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/H72D-9RZ3]; Molly K. McKew, How
Twitter Bots and Trump Fans Made #ReleaseTheMemo Go Viral, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/02/04/trump-twitter-russians -release-the-memo
-216935 [https://perma.cc/KM8Q-6PWQ]; David Z. Morris, Trolls and Bots Moved Fast to Po-
liticize Texas School Shooting on Social Media, FORTUNE (May 19, 2018), https://fortune.com
/2018/05/19/santa-fe-shooting-trolls-bots-conspiracy-theory/ [https://perma.cc/9S83-ZZ2K].
11 See Gabe O’Connor & Avie Schneider, How Russian Twitter Bots Pumped Out Fake
News During the 2016 Election, NPR (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechcon
sidered/2017/04/03/522503844/how-russian-twitter-bots-pumped-out-fake-news-during-the-2016
-election [https://perma.cc/5EXD-SVWQ]; Samuel Woolley & Phil Howard, Bots Unite to Auto-
mate the Presidential Election, WIRED (May 15, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016
/05/twitterbots-2/ [https://perma.cc/C6VD-R5P9]. For examples of political bots, see Every
Trump-ette (@everytrumpette), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/everytrumpette [https://perma.cc
/53AP-9D3J] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020); Erowid Sarah Palin (@SarowidPalinUSA), TWIT-
TER, https://twitter.com/SarowidPalinUSA [https://perma.cc/YMT5-4MMJ] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2020).
12 See Chhor, supra note 9.
13 Daniel Politi, American Alt-Right and Twitter Bots Are Key to Spreading French Election
Hack, SLATE (May 6, 2017, 5:45 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/05/ameri
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deploying AI communicators in efforts to influence democratic processes in certain
nations.14 Second, these entities often manipulate the marketplace of ideas by artifi-
cially boosting certain ideas that might otherwise fail to gain traction or acceptance and,
at the same time, pushing other, human-generated ideas, from the marketplace.15 In this
sense, the AI communicators have come to exploit and exacerbate fundamental
problems that scholars have long identified regarding the information marketplace
as Enlightenment thinkers such as John Milton and John Locke conceived it, and
how it has been interpreted as a theory of the First Amendment in the United States
and, to a lesser extent, employed by European courts.16 Finally, the courts in both
the European and United States legal systems appear ill-prepared to consistently
apply existing, human-communicator-focused precedent and legal understandings
to AI actors that lack the characteristics that define the “human condition,” as
thinker Hannah Arendt conceptualized it.17
These communicators do not labor or make decisions based on the inescapable
knowledge of their own mortality. As Arendt explained, “Trust in the reality of life, on
the contrary, depends almost exclusively on the intensity with which life is felt, on
the impact with which it makes itself felt.”18 This emerging class of communicators
does not function based on such a reality. They also do not sleep, vote, have families,
grow tired of repeating messages, or become emotional. Of course, to simply state that
they are not human and therefore ineligible for any kind of free expression safe-
guards oversimplifies the problem. Scholars have contended that AI actors, which in
this Article is used as a blanket term that includes algorithms, AI agents, and chatbots,19
can contribute valuable information to democratic discourse.20 It would also be a
mistake to conclude that AI communicators are simply another tool that humans use
to communicate, such as telephones or email accounts. While some AI communica-
tors do little more than act as vehicles for human-created information, increasingly
complex computer programs are taking part in human discourse, and prominent
scholars within the robotics law field have concluded it would be a mistake to attribute
all AI actors’ actions as extensions of their creators.21 As legal scholar Jack Balkin
explained, “AI agents create problems for law because one cannot always predict what
can-alt-right-and-twitter-bots-are-key-to-spreading-french-election-hack.html [https://perma
.cc/55CG-8TR4].
14 See, e.g., O’Connor & Schneider, supra note 11.
15 See id.; Woolley & Howard, supra note 11.
16 LOCKE, supra note 3, at 5–10; MILTON, supra note 3, at 45.
17 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 119–20 (1958).
18 Id. at 120.
19 Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO
ST. L. J. 1217, 1219 (2017). Balkin drew these different iterations of computer programs that
replicate human behavior together, reasoning that they represent similar concerns when it
comes to the foundational laws that should govern them. Id.
20 Norton, supra note 8, at 1145–46.
21 See Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 52 (2015).
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they will do when they interact with their environment.”22 Similarly, robotics law
scholar Ryan Calo concluded, “We can see already how robots begin to blur the line
between people and instrument, and how faulty assumptions about robots lead jurists
to questionable or contradictory results.”23 The European Parliament conveyed simi-
lar concerns in a 2017 resolution regarding recommendations from the Commission
on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, stating:
[T]he more autonomous robots are, the less they can be consid-
ered to be simple tools in the hands of other actors (such as the
manufacturer, the operator, the owner, the user, etc.); whereas this,
in turn, questions whether the ordinary rules on liability are suffi-
cient or whether it calls for new principles and rules to provide
clarity on the legal liability of various actors concerning respon-
sibility for the acts and omissions of robots where the cause
cannot be traced back to a specific human actor . . . .24
Thus, the growing complexity of AI communicators within democratic discourse
raises questions about the extent to which the U.S. and European legal systems are
prepared to handle the opaque realm that exists between computer programs that act
as human tools, much like a megaphone, and AI that include some level of unpre-
dictability and agency, such as bots that draw content from continuously changing
pools of data or those that emulate human-like interactive experiences with the
people who use them, such as the Lucia, a Spanish-speaking Facebook Messenger bot
that was created in the fall of 2018 to help those who were in the immigrant caravan
that was in Mexico and nearing the U.S. border.25 As political-oriented bots generated
about sixty percent of the discourse regarding the heavily politicized caravan on
Twitter, Lucia engaged those seeking to navigate the U.S. immigration system in a
conversation that was tailored to their responses.26
Lucia highlights another challenge that legal systems face regarding safeguard-
ing public discourse while at the same time protecting freedom of expression. AI
22 Id. at 51.
23 Ryan Calo, Robots in American Law 5 (U. Wash. Sch. L., Res. Paper No. 2016-04, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737598 [https://perma.cc/BE7W-GRH2].
24 European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to the
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA (2017)0051, http://www
.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0051_EN.html [https://perma.cc/3DNJ-KBZG]
(last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [hereinafter European Parliament Resolution].
25 See Jared Jaskot, Introducing Lucia: A Chatbot for Asylum Seekers, MEDIUM (Dec. 12,
2018), https://chatbotslife.com/introducing-lucia-a-chatbot-for-asylum-seekers-28f7bb01a
418 [https://perma.cc/52HX-DK6E].
26 Id.; Issie Lapowsky, Here’s How Much Bots Drive Conversation During News Events,
WIRED (Oct. 30, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/new-tool-shows-how-bots
-drive-conversation-for-news-events/ [https://perma.cc/KU84-4CZ6].
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communicators can contribute important information, a crucial ingredient to demo-
cratic discourse. The FOIA // Feed (@FOIAFeed), for example, is a Twitter bot run
by the Freedom of the Press Foundation that tweets about reporting that incorporates
data gathered using Freedom of Information Act requests.27 Both the Athens and
Frankfurt airports have Facebook Messenger–based bots that allow travelers to ask
them questions and receive information about tickets, shops, and airport security.28
Whatever their contributions, the presence of such non-human messengers within
virtual spaces represents a substantial challenge to traditional legal systems regarding
freedom of expression, particularly in Europe and the United States, where long-held
constructs regarding the free flow of information in democratic society struggle to
account for an emerging class of communicators that certainly convey information but,
quite fundamentally, lack personhood.29 For these and other reasons, the European
and American legal systems provide foundational building blocks regarding how
such communicators can be understood from a law and policy standpoint.30 Their
similarities and differences can be instructive as we consider an emerging concern
that is fundamentally international in nature.
This Article examines the question of freedom of expression rights for AI actors
through the lenses provided by existing U.S. and European free-expression prece-
dents regarding non-human actors, as well as the marketplace of ideas theory. While
several scholars are addressing this emerging concern—and coming to a variety of
conclusions31—this Article draws together international and theoretical building
blocks to contribute another potential approach to how such actors’ rights can be
understood. To be clear, the Article’s foundational concerns relate with the question of
how these legal systems, and others around the world, can safeguard the type of human
interaction—the exchange of ideas and flow of information—that is fundamental to
societal discourse from being overwhelmed and dominated by AI communicators,
while at the same time protecting freedom of expression, which generally requires
the government to remain clear of deciding who can and cannot communicate in
most instances. In doing so, the Article explores legal rationales for freedom of
expression rights for AI communicators, ultimately outlining a revised, artificial
marketplace approach to conceptualizing the flow of information.
27 FOIA // FEED (@FOIAFeed), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/FOIAFeed [https://perma
.cc/22NC-SAWC] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
28 Paul Sillers, Robots, Chatbots and Augmented Reality: The Future of Travel and the
Coolest Airport Tech, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/travel
/news-and-advice/future-travel-airport-technology-hi-tech-chatbots-robots-augmented-re
ality-ai-a7961171.html [https://perma.cc/RMR7-P89E].
29 See, e.g., Norton, supra note 8, at 1150–51.
30 See id. at 1149; see also European Parliament Resolution, supra note 24.
31 See generally Balkin, supra note 19; Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw,
103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (2015); Ignacio N. Cofone, Servers and Waiters: What Matters in the
Law of A.I., 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 167 (2018); Norton, supra note 8; Tim Wu, Machine
Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013).
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The Article consists of four parts: Part I defines artificial intelligence and con-
siders the types of AI communicators that are involved in human discourse. It also
explores the connective nature of virtual spaces. Part II examines the foundational
assumptions of the marketplace of ideas theory, as well as discursive thought, a
philosophical approach to freedom of expression in democratic society that is uniquely
positioned to account for the collective and community-based properties of networked
technologies and the AI communicators that have found homes in online spaces and
are changing the way the marketplace of ideas functions. Part III considers how the
European and American legal systems have handled questions regarding the rights
of non-human communicators in the past and how international statements about
freedom of expression might influence future decisions. Part IV concludes by
drawing from these and other considerations to outline the artificial marketplace
approach to understanding the rights of AI communicators.
I. AI COMMUNICATORS & VIRTUAL SPACES
AI and other non-human actors created by people, such as Frankenstein’s monster,
Maschinemensch in Metropolis, Hal from 2001: A Space Odyssey, and the operating
system in Her, have long captured human imaginations.32 In fact, Isaac Asimov’s fic-
tional, genre-defining “three fundamental Rules of Robotics” have played an outsized
role in legal discussions about how we should understand questions about the rights of
robots and computer programs.33 Legal scholars have paid increasingly careful attention
to robotics law in recent years.34 They have done so as more human activities are
automated, and online networked technologies—and the virtual environments they
create—have provided ideal environments for computer programs to communicate
with humans and to determine the information humans do and do not encounter.35
Scholars within the robotics law field have considered a variety of concerns, such
as civil and criminal liability for the physical or emotional harms such entities might
create, or privacy and copyright questions that emerge in an era when computer
32 Jack Balkin uses fictitious characters as a starting point for his discussion of how we
should understand AI rights. Balkin, supra note 19, at 1218–19. Similarly, John Weaver begins
his book by discussing fictional works. JOHN FRANK WEAVER, ROBOTS ARE PEOPLE TOO: HOW
SIRI, GOOGLE CAR, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WILL FORCE US TO CHANGE OUR LAWS
3–5 (2014). Both Balkin and Gabriel Hallevy start their discussions with Isaac Asimov’s
Three Laws of Robotics. Balkin, supra note 19, at 1217–18; Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal
Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities—From Science Fiction to Legal Social Control,
4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 171, 172–73 (2010); see ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT 37 (1950).
33 ASIMOV, supra note 32, at 37 (1. “[A] robot may not injure a human being, or, through
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.” 2. “[A] robot must obey the orders given
it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.” 3. “[A]
robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the
First or Second Laws.”).
34 See generally Calo, supra note 31; Cofone, supra note 31; Norton, supra note 8.
35 See, e.g., Lapowsky, supra note 26; Sillers, supra note 28.
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programs are scraping information and creating new works.36 This Article focuses
on rights and freedoms for AI actors, rather than the types of question that arise
when these entities break existing laws. Addressing the question of free expression
for AI requires that we establish the nature of such communicators and the net-
worked environments in which they engage with people.
A. Definitions
The term “artificial intelligence” was coined during a conference that was orga-
nized by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and conducted at
Dartmouth College in the summer of 1956.37 Those who proposed the conference,
including Claude Shannon, contended “that every aspect of learning or any other
feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be
made to simulate it.”38 In the ensuing decades, scholars have defined AI as systems
that can think and act rationally in ways that mirror human behavior and intelli-
gence.39 This Article uses AI as a term that engulfs computer programs that have the
capacity to take action in their environment, algorithms, and machine learning tools.
While these terms certainly can be distinguished from one another, the central
concern of this Article is how computer-based, non-human actors are influencing
human relationships, community, and discourse, as well as how we should conceptu-
alize their nature and the extent to which they can communicate freely in democratic
society. Thus, AI, for present purposes, refers to computer-based communicators,
including algorithms, AI agents, and chatbots.
U.S. and European courts have done little to guide efforts to agree upon distinct
legal definitions for AI and related technologies. When the courts have referred to AI,
they have primarily done so in reference to algorithms, computer programs that filter
online content or sift through data to return search results.40 Computer scientists
Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig characterized AI systems as being on a spectrum
from weak to strong, concluding that strong systems can replicate human-like con-
sciousness, while weaker systems are limited to merely executing programmed
36 See, e.g., WEAVER, supra note 32, at 4; Hallevy, supra note 32, at 177; David C. Vladeck,
Essay, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 117, 120 (2014).
37 Artificial Intelligence, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stan
ford.edu/entries/artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/22LP-59H6] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
38 J. McCarthy et al., A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Arti-
ficial Intelligence (Aug. 31, 1955), http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/dartmouth/dartmouth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KQX-VAC5].
39 Artificial Intelligence, supra note 37.
40 See, e.g., ACLU v. Gonzalez, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 789–90 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Langdon v.
Google, Inc. 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech.,
Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003); Am. Library
Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 410 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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actions.41 Weak AI include Apple’s Siri and Amazon’s Alexa, which simply tran-
scribe verbal requests for information by humans and then produce auditory versions
of the search results.42 They represent a technological shift in the availability of
information, but do not represent a dynamic AI entity that can replicate human actions
or consciousness. Strong, or full, AI is more theoretical at this point, as no computer
program has been able to fully implement the human brain or human actions.43
Google’s DeepMind, however, is working on numerous projects in which advanced
algorithms learn to replicate limited aspects of human behavior, such as teaching itself
how to excel at chess or predicting eye diseases and providing recommendations for
treatment.44 As far as communicators go, advanced chatbots, such as Mitsuku and Rose,
have won the Loebner Prize for their ability to replicate human interaction to the extent
that other humans have no idea whether they are communicating to with a person or
a bot.45 The potential applications for such communicators, from automating most com-
mercial transactions to making political arguments that are triggered by the use of
certain hashtags or keywords, have significant implications for discourse in society,
even if they are limited in their ability to interact organically with others.46 The impli-
cations are particularly important as AI actors become more nuanced and complex,
and the nature of the virtual environments in which they encounter human commu-
nicators continue to change the way individuals communicate and understand both
themselves and others.
B. The Nature of Virtual Spaces
The emergence of networked communication tools and the virtual realms for
discourse that they create have led to substantial changes for human and AI entities.
Most crucial among these changes, however, has been the emergence of a space in
which the two can coexist within the same, virtual environment.47 While human-like
walking, talking robots—as seen in the movies—remain more imagination than reality,
41 STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH
29 (1995).
42 See id.; Massaro & Norton, supra note 5, at 1192–93.
43 Balkin, supra note 19, at 1220.
44 David Silver et al., A General Reinforcement Learning Algorithm that Masters Chess,
Shogi, and Go Through Self-Play, 362 SCIENCE 1140 (2018), https://science.sciencemag.org
/content/sci/362/6419/1140.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ7X-T6S7]; Predicting Eye Disease
with Moorfields Eye Hospital, DEEPMIND: BLOG (Nov. 5, 2018), https://deepmind.com/blog
/article/predicting-eye-disease-moorfields [https://perma.cc/J6Q3-HRCL].
45 Meet Mitsuku, PANDORABOTS, https://pandorabots.com/mitsuku/ [https://perma.cc
/G4AN-F4M7] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020); Rose, BRILLIG UNDERSTANDING, INC., http://brillig
understanding.com/rosedemo.html [https://perma.cc/K7XG-6JNX] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
46 See Clive Thompson, May A.I. Help You?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/14/magazine/tech-design-ai-chatbot.html [https://nyti
.ms/2DkbKsu].
47 See Massaro & Norton, supra note 5, at 1170–71.
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the relatively minimal entry requirements in virtual spaces allow computer programs,
absent physical forms, to capitalize upon anonymity and lack of presence to engage
with humans on a somewhat level playing field.48 When combined, the introduction
of human and non-human communicators into common, interconnected, and generally
anonymous spaces is fundamentally changing the way democratic discourse occurs in
the twenty-first century.49 Crucially, the growing presence of AI entities in such spaces
means that the influence of networked tools on discourse can no longer be considered
without accounting for AI communicators. Networked technologies have substan-
tially lowered the hurdles that once limited individuals—and AI entities—from com-
municating messages to audiences.50
Discourse now takes place within a choice-rich, deeply fragmented environment.51
In such an environment, individuals can select the people, organizations, and sources
of information with which they would like to interact, ultimately limiting the scope
of potential ideas they encounter.52 Such a development has led individuals to
construct intentional communities in which they surround themselves with generally
like-minded individuals and sources of information that reinforce their pre-existing
ideas.53 Legal scholar Cass Sunstein explained that “[m]embers of a democratic public
will not do well if they are unable to appreciate the views of their fellow citizens, if
they believe ‘fake news,’ or if they see one another as enemies or adversaries in some
kind of war.”54 Individuals in such environments generally can only become more
extreme in their views, since they primarily encounter ideas that reinforce their ex-
isting beliefs and, conversely, few messages or individuals who present opposing
perspectives.55 Such a process of community formation and construction of realities
is fundamentally different than how such information flowed and interactions oc-
curred in preceding eras. Generally, in the twentieth century, traditional news orga-
nizations provided relatively similar sets of information to mass audiences.56 Since
48 See Persily, supra note 6, at 70.
49 See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 17 (2008); SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE
FROM TECHNOLOGY AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER 11 (2011); Massaro & Norton, supra note
5, at 1172.
50 See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
51 SHIRKY, supra note 49, at 71–74; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 44 (2007);
Shanto Iyengar & Kyu S. Hahn, Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity
in Media Use, 59 J. COMM. 19, 20 (2009).
52 See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 3 (2d ed. 2010); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 41–48 (2017).
53 For network analysis of this phenomenon, see Itai Himelboim et al., Birds of a Feather
Tweet Together: Integrating Network and Content Analyses to Examine Cross-Ideology Ex-
posure on Twitter, 18 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 154, 166–71 (2013).
54 SUNSTEIN, supra note 52, at IX.
55 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 76–77.
56 See JARED SCHROEDER, THE PRESS CLAUSE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY’S FOURTH WAVE:
MEDIA LAW AND THE SYMBIOTIC WEB 69–70 (2018).
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audiences had a limited range of sources from which to choose, citizens generally
received relatively similar baselines of ideas from which to enter into interactions
with others.57 Furthermore, when individuals entered into discourse with others, they
almost always had to be physically present, which brought with it certain dynamics
that created social capital and strengthened the ties that bound individuals together
in a community.58
In this regard, networked communication scholars define a “tie” as a relation-
ship “between communicators wherever they exchange or share resources such as
goods, services, social support or information.”59 People who have long-standing
relationships in which they share ideas and communicate often maintain deeper
bonds than those who do not.60 Scholars have concluded that online interactions are
inherently less likely to involve strong ties or the exchange of meaningful amounts
of social capital between participants.61 This conclusion aligns with sociologist and
psychologist Sherry Turkle’s conclusion that, “in person, we have access to the mes-
sages carried in the face, the voice, and the body. Online, we settle for simpler fare:
We get our efficiency and our chance to edit, but we learn to ask questions that a return
email can answer.”62 Thus, individuals not only have significant choice regarding
the facts and truths they encounter in their intentionally formed communities, they
also fundamentally do not form close relationships with others in virtual forums.
The result of such an environment, one in which individuals within a society do not
share common factual basis for interactions with others, is a sort of fragmented multi-
verse of public spheres. These shifts in human communication—how individuals
communicate and form relationships—have opened the door for AI agents to succeed
in having their messages accepted and shared within virtual communities.63 In both
the Brexit vote and the 2016 U.S. presidential election, for example, bots were found
to be most influential when they reinforced existing opinions.64
Within each fragmented, ideologically formed public sphere, the truths that emerge
from interactions among individuals in that community might be substantially different
than those in other online spaces. Therefore, in some communities, the truth is that
former United States President Barack Obama was born in Kenya, while in others
57 See id. at 70.
58 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
59 Caroline Haythornthwaite, Strong, Weak, and Latent Ties and the Impact of New Media,
18 INFO. SOC’Y 385, 386 (2002); see also PUTNAM, supra note 58, at 18–19.
60 Haythornthwaite, supra note 59, at 386.
61 SHERRY TURKLE, RECLAIMING CONVERSATION: THE POWER OF TALK IN A DIGITAL
AGE 23 (2015).
62 Id.
63 See id.; Bessi & Ferrara, supra note 6.
64 See Yuriy Gorodnichenko et al., Social Media, Sentiment and Public Opinions: Evidence
from #Brexit and #USElection 3 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24631,
2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24631.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2TJ-8X64].
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such a conclusion is preposterous.65 The emergence and massive spread of persistently
believed, yet directly conflicting realities such as these requires a different conceptual-
ization of the flow of information and the nature of understanding in democratic
society. In particular, the marketplace metaphor, which has dominated American under-
standings of freedom of expression for nearly a century and has historically been
associated with European-founded Enlightenment understandings, must be reconsid-
ered in light of the loss of shared realities and the fragmentation into communities of
generally like-minded individuals.66 While the marketplace theory is discussed in more
detail later in the Article, it suffices at this point to conclude that we must consider
a fundamentally different type of information marketplace in the twenty-first century.67
This change in the flow of information has altered how people interact with
others and AI communicators. Individuals are forming intentionally crafted personali-
ties that are substantially influenced by the nature of the tools they use to communi-
cate.68 The relative anonymity and global nature of discourse in virtual spaces, along
with the lack of strong bonds between individuals, is influencing how individuals
choose to represent themselves.69 While people are limited regarding self-representa-
tion in physical environments, virtual spaces present opportunities and challenges
for identity formation and enactment. Communication scholar Zizi Papacharissi ex-
plained that “the individual must then engage in multiple mini performances that
combine a variety of semiological references so as to produce a presentation of the self
that makes sense to multiple audiences.”70 Thus, while the lack of physical presence
and the global nature of virtual spaces allow individuals to largely construct their
identities online, the form of the tool also plays a role in stripping away nuance.71
Therefore, individuals limit the amount of subtlety in their messages as they seek to
mitigate the potential for misunderstanding and to reach the different constituencies
within their intentionally formed communities.72 The result is generally more strident,
emboldened self-representations. Individuals trade the types of surgical, strategic
efforts they might have made in a physical environment for more blunt projections
of meaning to difficult-to-identify online audiences.73
65 Caitlin Oprysko, Michelle Obama: ‘I’d Never Forgive’ Trump for Promoting Birther
Conspiracy, POLITICO (Nov. 9, 2018, 7:55 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/09
/michelle-obama-trump-birther-978810 [https://perma.cc/B7GN-J9PH].
66 See Jared Schroeder, Shifting the Metaphor: Examining Discursive Influences on the
Supreme Court’s Use of the Marketplace Metaphor in Twenty-First-Century Free Expression
Cases, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383, 426–30 (2016); see also infra Section II.B.
67 See Schroeder, supra note 66, at 430.
68 See, e.g., TURKLE, supra note 49, at 11.
69 Zizi Papacharissi, A Networked Self: Identity Performance and Sociability on Social Net-
work Sites, in FRONTIERS IN NEW MEDIA RESEARCH 207, 209 (Francis L.F. Lee et al. eds., 2013).
70 See id. at 209.
71 See id.
72 See SCHROEDER, supra note 56, at 69–74.
73 Id. at 69–70.
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Each of these concerns—the choice-rich environment, human-relationship-
limiting tools, fragmented virtual communities, limited bonds and social capital, and
the intentional and limited nature of self-representation—all not only substantially
influence human discourse, but enable AI communicators to thrive.74 While AI en-
tities that truly learn from experience and can interact with their environment, such
as Google’s DeepMind project, are still being developed, computer-based communi-
cators are becoming more and more adept at mimicking human communication.75
The Cleverbot, a program that has been learning from its exchanges with humans
for more than a decade, references more than 180 million lines of previous interac-
tions each time it engages in a conversation.76 The Picture Description Bot selects
images from Wikimedia Commons and considers them using Microsoft’s Cognitive
Services.77 The service attempts to describe what is in the picture and then posts the
image and description on Twitter (@picdescbot).78 While the descriptions are correct
as often as they are hilariously wrong, these types of communicators continue to
develop human-like capabilities.79 The lack of physical form, and the ways that
individuals interact and create communities online, has opened the doors for AI
communicators to easily integrate themselves into human discourse. While they might
struggle to mimic the more intricate aspects of human behavior, the often blunt, ideo-
logically focused messages humans share in their intentional communities online and
the general lack of meaningful relationships allow such non-human communicators
to fit into existing narratives and integrate themselves into human discourse.80
C. AI and Political Discourse
Many AI communicators automatically post at certain times or are set up to re-
spond to certain hashtags or key words.81 Such actors operate about 15% of Twitter’s
74 See id. at 71.
75 See Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control Through Deep Reinforcement Learn-
ing, 518 NATURE 529, 529 (2015); see also, e.g., Microsoft Azure, Cognitive Services, http://
azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services/ [https://perma.cc/S9MG-3NSV] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2020).
76 See Jennifer Hill et al., Real Conversations With Artificial Intelligence: A Comparison
Between Human–Human Online Conversations and Human–Chatbot Conversations, 49 COM-
PUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 245, 245–50 (2015). See generally Cleverbot, Press Release, TURING
TEST: The Bots Are Not Amused (June 11, 2014), https://www.cleverbot.com/amused [https://
perma.cc/W679-MSMV].
77 Picdescbot, About This Bot, TUMBLR, https://picdescbot.tumblr.com/about [https://perma
.cc/8CT7-3FMZ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 See, e.g., Hill et al., supra note 76, at 249.
81 See Sarah Kessler, How Twitter Bots Fool You into Thinking They Are Real People,
FAST COMPANY (June 10, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3031500/how-twitter-bots
-fool-you-into-thinking-they-are-real-people [https://perma.cc/LPS7-TV7Q].
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320 million active monthly users.82 Similarly, as many as 24 million of Instagram’s
700 million accounts are run by non-human users.83 During the most recent election
in the United Kingdom, partisans created bots on Tinder, the dating and hook-up
app, to strike up conversations with younger voters.84 The bots communicated more
than 30,000 messages, swiping “yes” on users and, if the other person swiped “yes”
back, they engaged them in a discussion about the upcoming election rather than a
conversation about getting together.85 Several months beforehand, in November 2016,
about one-quarter of all of the tweets about the United States presidential election
were generated by bots.86 In the aftermath of the November 2016 election and the
Brexit referendum beforehand that June, a group of researchers suggested that bot
activity on Twitter led to a 0.6% increase in votes for Trump and a 0.54% swing for
“leave” votes in the Brexit referendum.87 The authors emphasized that the AI commu-
nicators’ impact was strengthened by the speed at which information travels online and
the fragmented nature of online communities.88 Many of the bots, in these instances
and in matters that have since arisen, communicate false or misleading information.89
The AI agents are especially impactful during politically charged events. AI communi-
cators dominated online discussion of the immigrant caravan, which was central to the
discourse during the run-up to the U.S. midterm elections in 2018.90 In the week
before the election, they accounted for 40 to 60% of the online discussion about the
caravan.91 Of course, many of the human account holders who encountered the AI-
authored messages had no idea that the ideas they were repeatedly encountering
were not an example of widespread public support. They were, instead, artificially
boosted ideas.
82 Michael Newberg, As Many as 48 Million Twitter Accounts Aren’t People, Says Study,
CNBC (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/10/nearly-48-million-twitter-accounts
-could-be-bots-says-study.html [https://perma.cc/3EGT-5VPQ].
83 Alexandra Ma, Millions of Instagram Users Are Just Spambots, HUFFPOST (July 2,
2015), http://www.huffpost.com/entry/instagram-spambot_n_7708550.html [https://perma
.cc/5BG8-E8H9].
84 Yara Rodrigues Fowler & Charlotte Goodman, How Tinder Could Take Back the White
House, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/opinion/how-tin
der-could-take-back-the-white-house.html [https://perma.cc/G8XW-PX9S].
85 Id.; see also Robert Gorwa & Douglas Guilbeault, Tinder Nightmares: The Promise
and Peril of Political Bots, WIRED UK (July 7, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/tinder
-political-bots-jeremy-corbyn-labour [https://perma.cc/MRJ9-K77R].
86 Kollanyi et al., supra note 9, at 4.
87 Gorodnichenko et al., supra note 64, at 27.
88 Id. at 1.
89 See Bob Abeshouse, Troll Factories, Bots and Fake News: Inside the Wild West of So-
cial Media, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/americas/2018/02
/troll-factories-bots-fake-news-wild-west-social-media-180207061815575.html  [https://perma
.cc/8NKV-B7VA].
90 See Lapowsky, supra note 26.
91 Id.
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Choice-rich virtual environments have created ideal spaces for AI communica-
tors to reinforce the strongly held, and seldom-challenged, narratives that are found
within fragmented, intentional communities and to mimic the self-representation
approaches that are used by many human account holders. The bot-based activities
in recent elections in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as
evidence that foreign bots have engaged in issue-based campaigns, clearly illustrate
that the combination of emerging AI communicators and the nature of virtual en-
vironments have raised substantial questions about the place of such entities within
democratic discourse throughout the world.92
II. THE MARKETPLACE AND DISCURSIVE THOUGHT
Questions regarding the rights of AI communicators almost inherently find
themselves caught up in concerns about the flow of information and their potential
influence on meaning making among citizens in democratic society. These entities
lack the characteristics that have long been associated with being human, particu-
larly in regard to conscience and empathy, but are endowed with the ability to share
discourse-enabling information and to interact with humans. Thus, these entities
bring the potential for significant interruption, and even market failure, into the flow
of ideas and interactions among citizens in democratic society. Such a concern
inherently relates to the marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment, the
dominant justification for freedom of expression in the United States.93 The theory
assumes that in a relatively free communication environment, rational individuals
are capable of discerning truth from falsity.94 Thus, truthful ideas will succeed and false
ideas will fail in the open market. The theory does not purely pertain to the United
States legal system.95 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has cited the
theory in several freedom-of-expression-related decisions.96 This Section examines the
basic assumptions of marketplace theory and its shortcomings, which are particularly
apparent when it comes to AI communicators. This Section furthermore considers
how the theory has been used in ECtHR decisions before outlining the foundational
assumptions of discourse theory and the approach’s potential for reinvigorating
marketplace theory in the twenty-first century.
92 See Abeshouse, supra note 89.
93 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15 (1982).
94 Id. at 15–16; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1, 3 (1984); Philip M. Napoli, The Marketplace of Ideas Metaphor in Communications
Regulation, 49 J. COMM. 151, 153 (1999).
95 See, e.g., Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 430 n.2, 434,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 [https://perma.cc/7ZM6-3SJK].
96 See, e.g., Delfi AS v. Esotnia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 414, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng
?i=001-126635 [https://perma.cc/DXF3-VFT6]; Taranenko v. Russia, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
28, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-142969 [https://perma.cc/A5MT-J7AD]; Mouvement
Raëlien Suisse, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 434; Karatas v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 105,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58274 [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58274].
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A. The Holmsian Marketplace
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes introduced the marketplace of ideas theory of the
First Amendment in his dissent in Abrams v. United States in 1919.97 Jacob Abrams and
four other Russian immigrants who distributed leaflets in New York City to protest the
U.S. military’s actions on Russian soil toward the end of World War I were convicted
of violating the Espionage Act of 1917.98 The law, which was signed soon after the
United States entered the war, criminalized any communication that could be under-
stood as interfering with military operations, supported enemy activities, encouraged
members of the military to be disloyal, or obstructed the draft.99 Justice Holmes had
written for a unanimous Court in three cases that were substantially similar to Abrams
in the previous term, only eight months earlier, concluding in each case that the Espio-
nage Act did not violate freedom of expression.100 The Court came to the same conclu-
sion in Abrams, but Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Louis Brandeis, dissented.101 In
doing so, he constructed a much different argument.102 He explained,
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . . . .103
He continued by concluding that his finding was “the theory of our Constitution.”104
While it was a dozen more years before the Supreme Court struck down a law based
on its interpretation of the First Amendment,105 the dissent created a lasting rationale
for freedom of expression.106
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams was substantially based on his understand-
ing of the nature of truth.107 Importantly, however, his conclusions in this regard
97 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
98 Id. at 616–19.
99 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217.
100 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204, 205–06 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919).
101 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 630.
104 Id.
105 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam).
106 See Howard C. Anawalt, The Right to Communicate, 13 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 219,
227 (1984) (“Holmes states that there is a market place of ideas where all communications
are free to circulate.”).
107 See Paul L. Murphy & Patrick Gerry, Opening Up the Marketplace to Free Trade in
Ideas, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 415, 416 (1989).
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were substantially different than the assumptions that have generally come to be
associated with the theory. He did not believe in objective truth, a conclusion he
communicated in many of his legal and personal writings. In a letter ten years after
he wrote the Abrams dissent, he declared “[a]bsolute truth is a mirage.”108 In another
letter, this time in 1912, he explained to a friend that facts change and can only be
taken for what they are at the moment they are needed.109 Similarly, in his book, The
Common Law, which was published early in his career in 1881, he explained that
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”110 Ultimately, rather
than an objective truth, Justice Holmes contended he was a “bettabilitarian,” a term
he created to describe his belief that the best anyone can do when making a decision
is to bet using the facts as they know that at the time and their personal experi-
ences.111 He also rejected those who claimed to have ownership of absolute truth,
contending that such unmoving positions were what led the U.S. Civil War, in
which he was shot on three different occasions.112 In “Natural Law,” which was
published a year before the Abrams dissent, he explained, “[W]hen differences are
sufficiently far reaching, we try to kill the other man rather than let him have his
way. But that is perfectly consistent with admitting that, so far as appears, his
grounds are just as good as ours.”113 Thus, the Holmsian marketplace, as introduced
in Abrams and contextualized in his other legal and personal writings, contended
that, since no one could know that absolute truth, the government should generally
avoid limiting expression.114
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Marketplace
Since Justice Holmes’s use of the marketplace metaphor in 1919, the Supreme
Court has consistently employed it as a tool to rationalize decisions to protect freedom
of expression.115 Justices from a variety of ideological perspectives have used the meta-
phor and it has remained popular, particularly since the 1970s.116 Furthermore, justices
have used the metaphor in nearly every area of First Amendment law, including prior
108 THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS,
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 107 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
109 Id. at 7.
110 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Harv. Univ. Press 2009) (1881).
111 Jared Schroeder, The Holmes Truth: Toward a Pragmatic, Holmes-Influenced Concep-
tualization of the Nature of Truth, 7 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 169, 179–80 (2018).
112 See LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 61–62
(2001).
113 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1919).
114 For a more detailed look at Justice Holmes’s understandings of truth and his personal,
scholarly, and legal writings in that regard, see Schroeder, supra note 111, at 169–203.
115 W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNAL-
ISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40, 42 (1996).
116 See id.
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restraint, defamation, commercial speech, and obscenity.117 Though Justices have never
explicitly defined how they understand the marketplace of ideas and Justice Holmes’s
use of the marketplace in Abrams did not include any footnotes or in-text references
to sources that might have influenced his decision and his intended meaning, the meta-
phor has come to be associated, by Justices and legal scholars, with Enlightenment-
related assumptions about truth, the rationality of citizens, and the flow of information
in society.118 Such a connection between Enlightenment thought and the marketplace
of ideas can be seen in the Court’s decision in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC in
1969.119 Justice Byron White, in writing for the Court in its decision to uphold the
Fairness Doctrine, explained, “It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .”120 Im-
portantly, Justice White’s reasoning was constructed to rationalize upholding require-
ments that essentially forced broadcasters to allow a diversity of perspectives.121 In
other words, the Court justified upholding the doctrine because Justices understood it
as preserving the marketplace.122 Similarly, in 1953 in United States v. Rumely, which
dealt with political activist Edward Rumely’s fight with a House committee’s demand
that he provide the names of those who purchased his books in bulk, Justice William
Douglas wrote, the “publisher bids for the minds of men in the market place of ideas.
The aim of the historic struggle for a free press was ‘to establish and preserve the right
of the English people to full information . . . .’”123 Justice Douglas characterized these
conclusions as “the tradition behind the First Amendment.”124 In this sense, he as-
sociated the marketplace with the right to communicate and receive information.
The landmark 1974 defamation decision Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. indicates
similar connections between truth, the First Amendment, and the marketplace ration-
ale.125 Justice Lewis Powell, in writing for the Court, explained, “However pernicious
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
juries but on the competition of other ideas.”126 Finally, in relation to the Internet,
Justice John Paul Stevens concluded the Court’s 1997 decision in Reno v. ACLU, which
established that online communication would receive significant First Amendment
117 Schroeder, supra note 66, at 384; see, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826
(1975); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 36 (1973).
118 See Donna L. Dickerson, <Freedom of Expression> and Cultural Meaning: An Analysis
of Metaphors in Selected Supreme Court Texts, 1 COMM. L. & POL’Y 367, 368 (1996); Ingber,
supra note 94, at 3; Napoli, supra note 94, at 155.
119 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 389–90.
122 Id.
123 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247 (1936)).
124 Id.
125 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
126 Id. at 339–40.
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protection, with the finding that government regulation of online content “is more
likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”127 He con-
tinued, “The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”128
In each of these instances, the Justices communicated a concern for the flow of
information and the danger of the government influencing the ideas that can and
cannot be communicated in the marketplace of ideas.129 In doing so, the Justices
rationalized their uses of the marketplace metaphor with fundamental assumptions
regarding Enlightenment thought. In particular, Enlightenment thought generally
conceptualizes truth as being objective and universal, something that must be found
rather than created.130 It also assumes that individuals are generally rational and, given
access to unfettered ideas, are capable of discerning truth from falsity.131 Such thinking
can be seen in British philosopher and central Enlightenment figure John Milton’s
conclusions in Areopagitica in 1644.132 Milton, in arguing against licensing require-
ments and censorship, concluded, “Where there is much desire to learn, there of
necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good
men is but knowledge in the making.”133 He continued that, in an open contest, truth
would vanquish falsity and limits on publication halt the pursuit of truth.134 Nearly
fifty years later, British thinker John Locke communicated similar ideas, explaining that
truth and reason were gifts from God.135 He found that human nature was governed
by reason, which “teaches all mankind[ ] who will but consult it.”136 Finally, Scottish
thinker Adam Smith, whose ideas about the free market were published in The
Wealth of Nations in 1776, connected Enlightenment assumptions about human ra-
tionality with economic decisions.137 All of these influences can be seen in the ways
that the Court has come to understand the marketplace approach. This is particularly
127 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
128 Id.
129 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 886; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339–40; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56–57 (1953) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
130 See GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM 2–3 (2003); Fred S.
Siebert, The Libertarian Theory of the Press, in FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS: THE AUTHOR-
ITARIAN, LIBERTARIAN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOVIET COMMUNIST CONCEPTS OF WHAT
THE PRESS SHOULD BE AND DO 40 (Fred S. Siebert et al. eds., 1956).
131 Peter J. Gade, Postmodernism, Uncertainty, and Journalism, in CHANGING THE NEWS:
THE FORCES SHAPING JOURNALISM IN UNCERTAIN TIMES 64 (Wilson Lowrey & Peter J. Gade
eds., 2011); Siebert, supra note 130, at 40–41.
132 See MILTON, supra note 3, at 45.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 50.
135 LOCKE, supra note 3, at 5.
136 Id. at 4.
137 See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 151 (London, 9th ed. 1799).
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apparent in regard to Justices’ assumptions about the nature of truth and the likeli-
hood that truth will succeed and falsity will fail in a free exchange of ideas.138
C. The ECtHR and the Marketplace of Ideas
Though the ECtHR has employed marketplace-related rationales for freedom
of expression far less often than the U.S. Supreme Court, judges in several decisions
have carefully considered and sought to apply the theory in article 10–related de-
cisions.139 In Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, a 2012 ECtHR Grand Cham-
ber judgment, judges narrowly upheld a Swiss administrator’s right to reject a poster
that sought to bring awareness to the Raelien Movement.140 The poster read “The
Message from Extraterrestrials” and included a phone number and website address.141
The group, as the Court outlined, believes in creating a superior genetic version of hu-
manity and has been connected with pedophilia.142 The Movement contended that
halting it from displaying its poster violated its article 10 rights under the ECHR.143 The
Grand Chamber upheld the limitations on the public display of the poster but, in its
reasoning, contrasted public parks and billboards with online content.144 The court
reasoned, “If streets and parks of a city are the historical quintessential public fora, the
Internet is today’s global marketplace of ideas.”145 In doing so, the court indicated that
different forums, online versus physical, should receive different levels of protection
under article 10.146 In two extensive footnotes that accompanied the reference, the
court attributed the marketplace approach to Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams, but
went a step further, associating the theory not only with Enlightenment thought, in-
cluding Milton’s Areopagitica, but also with German thinker Jürgen Habermas, whose
work (discussed later in this Article) operates using fundamentally different assump-
tions about truth and the flow of information.147 Though the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly associated the marketplace with Enlightenment thought,148 it has never
138 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
139 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889 [hereinafter ECHR]. This Article promises “[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers.” Id. The second part of the Article, however, indicates that these safeguards come with
“duties and responsibilities.” Id. These “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restric-
tions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society.” Id.
140 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 [https://perma.cc/7ZM6-3SJK].
141 Id. at 382.
142 Id. at 382–83.
143 Id. at 390.
144 Id. at 434 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., dissenting).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 434 & n.2.
147 Id. at 430 n.2.
148 See Dickerson, supra note 118, at 368.
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connected it with more discursive ideas, such as those put forth by Habermas. Simi-
larly in Delfi v. Estonia, a 2015 ruling by the Grand Chamber of the same court,
justices concluded that despite Delfi’s efforts to take down offensive comments that
were made by users, a balance must be found between article 10’s protections for
expression and limiting immoral, hateful, and offensive expression.149 In the final
sentences of the dissent, judges drew together Areopagitica and the marketplace to
caution lawmakers against using the case to support wider limitations on online ex-
pression.150 The court explained that Areopagitica sought to convince Parliament
“that licensing had no place in the free pursuit of truth. It argued that an unlicensed
press would lead to a marketplace of ideas in which truth might prevail. It could not
undo the bigotry of Parliament. We hope that it will have more success today.”151
In four other cases that did not address online messages, jurists considered gov-
ernment efforts to limit potentially dangerous speech. In two cases from Turkey, the
court found that the communicator’s free expression rights were violated when officials
limited their expression.152 In dissents in both cases, judges qualified the marketplace
of ideas in contending not all speech should be protected.153 In Karatas v. Turkey, a
1999 judgment that involved a Kurdish author’s poetry, titled “The Song of Rebel-
lion,” dissenting judges explained, “Unlike the advocacy of opinions on the free
marketplace of ideas, incitement to violence is the denial of a dialogue, the rejection
of the testing of different thoughts . . . .”154 Similarly, in Sürek and Özdemir v.
Turkey five years earlier, two judges dissented when the court found government
officials had violated the newspaper publishers’ article 10 rights.155 The dissenting
judges contended the marketplace was reserved for peaceful expression, not threats
of violence.156 More recently, in Taranenko v. Russia in 2014, a protestor who
contended her article 10 rights were violated after she was arrested for joining a
group that occupied a government building in protest had her conviction upheld.157
149 Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 370, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-12
6635 [https://perma.cc/DXF3-VFT6].
150 Id. at 413–14 (Sajo & Tsotsoria, J.J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 414.
152 See Karatas v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 83, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001
-58274 [https://perma.cc/5WZU-JST2]; Sürek v. Turkey, App. Nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 25–26 (1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/rus?i=001-58278 [https://perma.cc
/Q3RA-N27N].
153 Karatas, 1999-IV at 121 (Wildhaber, J.; Pastor Ridruejo, J.; Costa, J. & Baka, J., dis-
senting); Sürek, App. Nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94, at 44 (Wildhaber, J.; K
J.; Baka, J. &Traja, J., dissenting).
154 Karatas, 1999-IV at 121 (Wildhaber, J.; Pastor Ridruejo, J.; Costa, J. & Baka, J., dis-
senting).
155 Sürek, App. Nos. 2397194 and 24277194, at 43 (Wildhaber, J.; K
J.; Baka, J. &Traja, J., dissenting).
156 See id. at 43–44.
157 Taranenko v. Russia, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1–2, 6, 20.
710 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:689
The court reasoned that “[e]xpression in the marketplace of ideas is only possible
where no violence is incited, threatened or exerted. Where there is violence, there
is no communication.”158
In each of these instances, judges used marketplace theory to distinguish com-
munication from violent action, something that is not a concern regarding AI agents
in online environments. In the Internet-related cases—Mouvement Raëlien Suisse
and Delfi—however, judges both associated the marketplace approach with Enlight-
enment ideas and used it to rationalize expansive protections for online expression.159
These Enlightenment-related assumptions about truth and information, however, are
central to consistent concerns regarding the marketplace of ideas foundational as-
sumptions. These concerns are particularly relevant in the twenty-first century.
D. The Marketplace’s Shortcomings
Despite the theory’s place as the U.S. Supreme Court’s most commonly used tool
for rationalizing safeguards for freedom of expression and its use by the ECtHR in
article 10 cases, legal scholars have consistently questioned the fundamental assump-
tions that have come to be associated with the marketplace approach. First Amend-
ment scholar Jerome Barron, in laying out his access-focused theory, contended
“[o]ur constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of free expression,
a belief that the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is freely accessible.”160 In rejecting the market-
place approach, he contended that, if such a space once existed, it no longer does.161
Instead, news organizations limit the range and scope of ideas that are accessible to
the public.162 Barron’s concern about access to ideas gets at one of the fundamental
assumptions of the marketplace approach—that rational individuals will encounter the
same or similar ideas as they seek to come to conclusions about truth and falsity.163
Legal scholar Stanley Ingber communicated similar concerns. He characterized the
marketplace as “more myth than reality.”164 He explained that political, economic, and
social perspectives firmly influence the information and frequency people encounter
and their personal conclusions regarding truth.165 He explained, “[T]he inevitable
differences in these perspectives caused by the vastly differing experiences among
158 Id. at 28 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J.; Turkovi , J. & Dedov, J., concurring).
159 See Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 321–23, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng
?i=001-126635 [https://perma.cc/DXF3-VFT6]; Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland,
2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 375–76, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-126635 [https://perma.cc
/DXF3-VFT6].
160 Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641, 1641 (1967).
161 See id. at 1641, 1678.
162 See id. at 1641.
163 See id. at 1678.
164 Ingber, supra note 94, at 48.
165 See id.
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individuals make resolution of disagreement through simple discussion highly
unlikely.”166 Similarly, Frederick Schauer explained,
[O]ur increasing knowledge about the process of idea transmis-
sion, reception, and acceptance makes it more and more difficult
to accept the notion that truth has some inherent power to prevail
in the marketplace of ideas, or that the distinction between truth
and falsity has much explanatory power in telling us which ideas
are likely to be accepted by the public and which are likely to be
rejected.167
Each of these scholars communicated concerns about the fundamental inner
workings of the theory. They questioned, in concerns that are particularly related
with AI actors, how the marketplace can function if generally rational individuals
do not encounter the same ideas and, if they do so, those ideas are presented differ-
ently or encountered with greater or lesser frequency.168 These concerns are of par-
ticular importance when considered within the context of the unique nature of AI
communicators and their ability to convey false information, to drown out human
ideas in the marketplace, and to reach individuals in intentionally formed, ideological
communities online.
Of course, at the heart of the theory, and of these concerns, is the discovery of
truth. Scholars have reserved their greatest criticisms and concerns regarding the
theory for its assumptions about the nature of truth. First Amendment scholar C.
Edwin Baker argued, “[T]he assumptions on which the classic marketplace of ideas
theory rests are almost universally rejected.”169 He continued that the “theory is
unworkable, dangerous, and inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation . . . of the
first amendment.”170 Baker, rather succinctly, concluded, “[T]ruth is not objective.”171
He recognized that many factors influence a person’s conclusions regarding what
they find to be true, such as “interests, desires, or aesthetics—which guide the de-
velopment of perceptions.”172 Similarly, legal scholar Vincent Blasi concluded that
when the marketplace concept’s assumptions of truth are questioned, it “is generally
found wanting as a persuasive contemporary rationale for free speech.”173 Ingber
166 Id. at 15.
167 Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 761, 777 (1986).
168 See Ingber, supra note 94, at 46–48; Schauer, supra note 167, at 776–77.
169 C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 12 (1989).
170 Id. at 3.
171 Id. at 12.
172 Id. at 13.
173 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521, 549 (1977).
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highlighted similar concerns. He explained, “In order to be discoverable, however,
truth must be an objective rather than subjective, chosen concept.”174 If the founda-
tional understandings about truth falter, the rest of the theory struggles. If truth is
subjective, then it is no longer something that can be discovered via a competition
with falsity in an exchange of ideas.175
When applied to twenty-first century questions regarding AI actors, it becomes
clear that the marketplace metaphor struggles as a rationale for freedom of expres-
sion. AI actors have the power to overwhelm human expression by posting countless
messages. In doing so, whether these messages are truthful or not, they push certain
ideas, or products, from the storefronts of the marketplace of ideas. When these con-
cerns are drawn together with the fragmented, polarized, choice-rich nature of online
communities, it is entirely possible that the marketplace of ideas will be transformed
into a series of storefronts that offer only one or two products—or ideas. In this
scenario, no competition between truth and falsity occurs. The decisions that humans
make regarding the ideas, people, and organizations they encounter in virtual spaces,
along with the power AI actors have to limit ideas in perspectives, can easily lead
to competition-free marketplaces of ideas.
E. Discursive Revisions
When the ECtHR placed Habermas alongside Milton’s and John Stewart Mill’s
ideas, as well as Justice Holmes’s conclusions from Abrams, in its discussion of the
marketplace approach in Mouvement Raëlien Suisse, it drew together entirely different
sets of assumptions regarding the flow of information and meaning making.176
Habermas, along with other thinkers, came to significantly different conclusions
regarding the nature of truth and the flow of information in democratic society.177
These conclusions, which are generally in philosophical opposition to Enlighten-
ment thought, are particularly relevant when we consider the nature of virtual spaces
and the human and non-human actors that inhabit them. Virtual spaces, along with
the interactions that occur among human and non-human communicators, are inher-
ently discursive. The term “discursive,” in this conceptualization, refers to interac-
tions that encourage collective, purposive discussions regarding issues and concerns
that face society. Discursive thought is in many ways an antithesis to the more tradi-
tional, Enlightenment-founded rationalizations that have dominated much of European
and American legal thought regarding how information flows and freedom of ex-
pression functions in democratic society.178
174 Ingber, supra note 94, at 15.
175 See Schroeder, supra note 66, at 393.
176 See Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, 430 n.2,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-126635 [https://perma.cc/JD4A-M6KZ].
177 See 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND
THE REALIZATION OF SOCIETY 11–14 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981).
178 See David A. Hollinger, The Enlightenment and the Genealogy of Cultural Conflict in
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In particular, discursive approaches to the flow of information and the construc-
tion of meaning within society generally assume that truth is the result of interac-
tions among free individuals.179 In this sense, truth emerges when individuals use
information to interact with one another with the goal of coming to a mutual agree-
ment.180 Such was the conclusion of American thinker John Dewey, who explained
that “knowledge is a function of association and communication; it depends upon tra-
dition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned.”181
Similarly, Habermas, who read Dewey’s work, made community and collective activity
central to his conceptualizations of the public sphere and, later, his theory of com-
municative action.182 He contended that “[i]n other contexts, one also speaks of
‘general presuppositions of communication,’ but I prefer to speak of general presup-
positions of communicative action because I take the type of action aimed at reaching
understanding to be fundamental.”183 In both understandings, the thinkers conceptu-
alized truth as subjective and personal, something that was the result of interactions
and ultimate agreements among free individuals.184 Thus, discursive thought finds
itself in fundamental opposition with a central assumption of the Enlightenment-
based understanding that truth is universal and pre-existent. Milton, for example,
contended that “[t]ruth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting
to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put
to the worse in a free and open encounter?”185 Similarly, French philosopher Jean-
Jacques Rousseau contended that “falsehood is capable of an infinite variety of combi-
nations; but the truth has only one manner of being.”186 Enlightenment thought, as
considered earlier, assumed that truth must be found. It is universal and pre-existent.
It is simply waiting to be discovered.
The more collective, discourse-based assumptions regarding truth carry with
them the requirement that individuals have access to quality information so that they
can be informed and carry shared basic understandings regarding matters of public
concern into discussions with others. Such an assumption was crucial to Habermas’s
the United States, in WHAT’S LEFT OF ENLIGHTENMENT: A POSTMODERN QUESTION 8–11 (Keith
Michael Baker & Peter Hanns Reill eds., 2001); Schroeder, supra note 66, at 398–401.
179 See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 154–55 (1927); JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DE-
MOCRACY 3–5 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
180 See DEWEY, supra note 179, at 154–55; HABERMAS, supra note 179, at 3–5.
181 DEWEY, supra note 179, at 158.
182 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 14–26 (Thomas Burger & Frederick
Lawrence trans., 1989); HABERMAS, supra note 177, at 11–14.
183 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, ON THE PRAGMATICS OF COMMUNICATION 21 (Maeve Cooke ed.,
1998).
184 See DEWEY, supra note 179, at 158; HABERMAS, supra note 183, at 21.
185 MILTON, supra note 3, at 50.
186 ROUSSEAU, supra note 3, at 159.
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conceptualization of the public sphere.187 The sphere, which Habermas described as
“the sphere” of “public authority” and “the sphere of private people come together as
a public,” flourished when newspapers provided information about matters of public
concern and individuals engaged with the news and used it to enter into interactions
with others with the goal of coming to a mutual agreement, or truth, regarding an
issue or concern.188 Of course, Enlightenment thought has generally assumed, as has
most consistently been stated in the marketplace-of-ideas theory, that in an open
exchange of ideas, rational individuals will identify the truth, separating it from false
ideas.189 The false ideas, therefore, will fall aside, just as poor products fail to find a
consistent market.190 The discourse model emphasizes protecting the formation of
truths that arise through interactions among informed individuals while Enlightenment-
based conceptualizations of the flow of information generally understand society’s
challenge as identifying the truth amidst a sea of falsities.
Of course, other important assumptions go into considering the two approaches.
The Enlightenment and discourse models differ regarding how they conceptualize
the place of the individual in society. Traditional Enlightenment thought has gener-
ally conceptualized society as being created to benefit the individual, while discur-
sive approaches emphasize the value of collective action and ability of each individual
to contribute to democratic deliberation.191 Dewey, for example, explained that “a
good citizen finds his conduct as a member of a political group enriching and enriched
by his participation in family life, industry, scientific and artistic associations.”192 Im-
portantly, discursive thought emphasizes community because its assumptions are
founded upon the importance of free individuals coming together to come to mutual
agreements regarding problems and concerns.193 These differences between these
assumptions about the nature of truth and community also fundamentally influence
how freedom of expression should be understood in democratic society. Both En-
lightenment and discursive thought are constructed upon the assumption that freedom
of expression is fundamental to self-government.194 Dewey emphasized the need for
“free gatherings of neighbors” and “gatherings of friends in[ ] living rooms.”195
187 HABERMAS, supra note 182, at 14–26.
188 See id. at 11, 27.
189 See HABERMAS, supra note 179, at 400, 470.
190 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41, 56–57 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931); see also Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Juris-
prudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2362 (2000).
191 See DEWEY, supra note 179, at 154–55; HABERMAS, supra note 182, at 3–9; Siebert,
supra note 130, at 41–42.
192 DEWEY, supra note 179, at 148.
193 See id. at 147–48.
194 See id. at 167–68.
195 John Dewey, Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us, in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE
LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 227 (J. Boydston ed., 1976).
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Similarly, Habermas contended that individuals must have access to a “diversity of
independent mass media, and a general access of inclusive mass audiences to the
public sphere.”196 Of course, Enlightenment thinkers came to similar conclusions in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Milton, in Areopagitica, railed against
governmental limitations on freedom of expression.197 Similarly, other Enlighten-
ment thinkers, such as Locke and Rousseau, emphasized the retention of human
liberty in the face of the institution of civil government.198 Rousseau, for example,
contended that individuals in democratic society give up “only such part of his powers,
goods, and liberty as it is important for the community to control.”199
Crucially, the assumptions within these two approaches regarding how the flow
of information is understood, and the very purpose behind freedom of expression,
can substantially influence how protections for AI communicators should be con-
ceptualized. This dichotomy between the theories begs the question whether expres-
sion should be protected so that fully formed truths can be separated from falsity,
or if expression must be safeguarded to allow free individuals to come together to
conduct discourse and come to mutual agreements, or truths, about matters of public
concern. In the Enlightenment model, information flows into a marketplace, where
rational individuals assess whether it is true or false and whether or not the idea
should be accepted.200 Conceivably, this model requires examining the extent to
which AI communicators can contribute to such a marketplace. Conversely, the
discourse model must consider such entities based on two points along the commu-
nicative process. First, whether they can convey information that provides a baseline
for individuals to enter into informed discourse with others. Second, whether they
themselves can contribute to such discourse by interacting with citizens. These
considerations, along with the larger question regarding the rights of AI communica-
tors, require considering the existent legal structures regarding such entities in the
United States and Europe.
III. AI SPEECH RIGHTS AND THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN SYSTEMS
Neither the European nor the U.S. legal systems have directly addressed the
question of freedom of expression rights for AI actors.
The ways in which the legal systems have interpreted freedom of expression ques-
tions more generally, particularly in regard to other non-human actors, provide guid-
ance regarding how jurists might understand AI communicators’ rights. Furthermore,
196 Jürgen Habermas, Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still
Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research,
16 COMM. THEORY 411, 412 (2006).
197 MILTON, supra note 3, at 45–46.
198 See generally LOCKE, supra note 3; ROUSSEAU, supra note 3.
199 ROUSSEAU, supra note 3, at xliii.
200 See generally LOCKE, supra note 3; ROUSSEAU, supra note 3.
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statements found in international treaties and covenants, primarily in regard to
European courts, provide insights regarding free expression rights for AI actors.
A. The U.S. System: Human, Corporation, or Animal?
The United States’ legal system has generally remained silent about AI commu-
nicators. In American Library Association, Inc. v. United States in 2002, a federal
district court considered the constitutionality of the Children’s Internet Protection
Act of 2000.201 The law required public schools and libraries to place filtering software
on the computers that are made available to students and patrons.202 Libraries and
schools that failed to comply would not receive certain federal grants.203 The judge
ruled that the law violated the First Amendment, reasoning that filtering algorithms
cannot identify “many distinctions between types of content that would be obvious to
a human. And of critical importance, no presently conceivable technology can . . .
determine whether a visual depiction fits the legal definitions of obscenity, child
pornography, or harmful to minors.”204 Essentially, he reasoned that the lack of human
characteristics equated to a limitation on First Amendment protections for expres-
sion.205 In the appeal that followed, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law did not
violate the First Amendment.206 While Justice David Souter mirrored the district
court judge’s reasoning in his dissent, none of the opinions in the decision referred
to filtering software as AI.207 Thus, the nation’s highest court has not, despite the
opportunity, specifically addressed algorithms.
More recently, when hackers stole and published the names of more than thirty-
seven million Ashley Madison users, the class action lawsuits that followed included
references to bots.208 Users claimed that the website, which assists customers in their
efforts to cheat on their spouses, “made extensive use of artificial intelligence ‘bots’
and other mechanisms to mimic fake users (specifically, female users) on the Ashley
Madison website in order to induce actual (predominantly male) users to make pur-
chases.”209 The Ashley Madison lawsuits were ultimately settled,210 but the question
201 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406–07 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
202 CHILDREN’S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT (2017), https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides
/childrens-internet-protection-act [https://perma.cc/366Z-F25W] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
203 See id.
204 Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
205 See id. at 408, 410–11.
206 See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 194 (2003).
207 See id. at 231–43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
208 See In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., MDL No. 2669, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46893, at *7–8 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2016).
209 Id. at *8.
210 See Jonathan Stempel, Ashley Madison Parent in $11.2 Million Settlement over Data
Breach, REUTERS (July 14, 2017), https://reuters.com/article/us-ashleymadison-settlement-id
USKBN19Z2f0 [https://perma.cc/9CX9-RW2C].
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of rights for AI communicators in the United States has not been. The courts, how-
ever, have provided some important building blocks in this regard.
1. Algorithms and Expression
Perhaps the most direct considerations of AI communicators have come in a pair
of federal district court decisions that considered whether the results of searches using
search engines such as Google and Bing are a form of protected speech.211 Both cases
considered how algorithms work and the corporations’ rights, rather than whether the
algorithms themselves enjoyed any particular protections.212 In 2003, Search King
sued Google after its place in the search engine’s PageRank system was down-
graded.213 The firm contended that Google’s algorithm’s decision to reduce the site’s
relative importance in queries “impacted the business opportunities available . . . by
limiting their exposure on Google’s search engine.”214 The judge concluded that the
lists of ranked websites that search engine algorithms produce are a form of opinion,
and are therefore protected First Amendment speech.215 The judge reasoned that,
“PageRanks do not contain provably false connotations. PageRanks are opinions—
opinions of the significance of particular web sites as they correspond to a search
query.”216 Quite paradoxically, the judge found the process by which the search re-
sults are ranked to be objective, but the results that come from the process to be
subjective.217 She explained that “the result, which is the PageRank—or the numeri-
cal representation of relative significance of a particular web site—is fundamentally
subjective.”218 Such a conclusion appears to indicate that AI actors, even those that
function by relatively rudimentary computer programming, can be found to have
human-like rights. Importantly, however, the question before the court in the case
was focused on the corporation’s rights rather than the AI communicator’s.219 In-
terestingly, four years later, a federal court in Delaware came to a similar conclusion,
but did so using significantly different reasoning. In Langdon v. Google, Inc., a North
Carolina website operator contended that Google violated his First Amendment rights
when it did not allow him to run advertisements for his websites and removed his
pages from its potential search results.220 The court found that compelling Google
211 See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 623, 630 (D. Del. 2007); Search King,
Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-14, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1, *4 (W.D. Okla.
May 27, 2003).
212 See Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 627; Search King, Inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *1.
213 Search King, Inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *1.
214 Id. at *4.
215 See id. at *3.
216 Id. at *4.
217 See id. at *3.
218 Id.
219 See id. at *3–4.
220 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 623, 626–27 (D. Del. 2007).
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to adjust its search results and advertising policies would equate to compelling the
corporation to speak.221 Citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo regarding a right-of-reply law that would have required newspapers
to print responses from those they criticized, the court explained that the First
Amendment does not allow such directives.222 Interestingly, the Langdon decision
pays little attention to the nature of search results, never mentioning the algorithms.
Instead, the court emphasized that the corporation cannot be compelled to “speak,”
as the petitioner sought.223 Thus, in both algorithm-centric cases, federal judges
found limiting the search outputs would violate the First Amendment. Legal scholar
Eugene Volokh and attorney Donald Falk came to similar conclusions regarding
these cases in a white paper they wrote for Google, contending that algorithm-based
search results constitute a form of editorial judgment, which makes them analogous
to newspapers or book publishers.224 Legal scholar Tim Wu, however, contended
that an algorithm does not express ideas, it simply gathers existent data, or ideas, in
response to a query.225 In this conceptualization, it is a vehicle, not a speaker.226 Both
approaches, as well as the courts’ decisions, provide building blocks regarding how
we should understand the rights of AI communicators.
2. Corporations and Blackie the Cat
Search King and Langdon, while two of the most AI-focused cases thus far in
the United States court system, were not principally about the rights of such commu-
nicators.227 Thus, to address the problem posed in this Article, we must turn to cases
that involve other forms of non-human actors. In particular, the courts have provided
strong precedents regarding corporate speech and the rights of animals. In terms of
animals, a federal appeals court ruled in 1983 that a couple suing on behalf of the
First Amendment rights of their talking cat had no real claim.228 Carl and Elaine Miles
had taught their cat, Blackie, to say “I love you” and “I want my Mama.”229 When the
city of Augusta, Georgia, required them to buy a business permit because they were col-
lecting money for their cat’s performances, they contended their First Amendment
221 See id. at 629–30.
222 See Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 256 (1974)).
223 See id. at 629–30.
224 Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search
Engine Search Results, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 899 (2012).
225 See Wu, supra note 8, at 1529–30.
226 See id.
227 See generally Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d 622; Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc.,
No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
228 Miles v. City Council, 710 F.2d 1542, 1544 n.5 (11th Cir. 1983).
229 Miles v. City Council, 551 F. Supp. 349, 350 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
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rights were violated.230 The circuit court was not convinced. The court concluded,
in a footnote at the end of its opinion, that “[t]his Court will not hear a claim that
Blackie’s right to free speech has been infringed. . . . [H]e cannot be considered a
‘person’ and is therefore not protected by the Bill of Rights.”231 The court explained,
finally, that, “if Blackie had such a right . . . [he] can clearly speak for himself.”232
More recent rulings have reinforced the court’s reasoning regarding Blackie’s rights.
In 2004, animal rights groups sued the Bush Administration on behalf of the world’s
whales, porpoises, and dolphins.233 The court concluded the marine life lacked
standing because they were not human.234 Similarly, animal rights groups sued Sea
World in 2012 on behalf of Tilikum, the focus of the award-winning documentary
“Blackfish,” and four other orcas.235 The group contended the whales’ captivity vio-
lated the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery.236 The judge, much as was
the case with Blackie the Cat, concluded that the Thirteenth Amendment “applies
to humans, and not orcas.”237 Finally, in Naruto v. Slater, better known as the
“Monkey Selfie” Case,238 the Ninth Circuit concluded that Naruto, the seven-year-
old crested macaque that picked up photographer David Slater’s unattended camera
and took several pictures of himself, could not claim authorship of the images under
U.S. copyright law.239 The court reasoned, citing the Cetacean Community v. Bush240
and Tilikum v. Sea World Parks and Entertainment, Inc.,241 that “this monkey—and
all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright
Act.”242 Thus, these cases suggest American courts have generally not been amena-
ble to extending human-like rights to non-humans. Fundamentally, judges communi-
cated the expectation in these cases that those who claimed fundamental human
rights be, well, human. This conclusion, however, is contradicted in one important
area of the law.
230 Id. at 351.
231 Miles, 710 F.2d at 1544 n.5.
232 Id.
233 Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).
234 Id. at 1179 (quoting Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New
England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993)).
235 See Tilikum v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1260 (S.D. Cal.
2012); see also Camila Demonoske, Tilikum, Sea World’s Famed Orca and Subject of ‘Black-
fish,’ Dies, NPR (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/06/508534005
/tilikum-seaworlds-famed-orca-and-subject-of-blackfish-dies [https://perma.cc/MQF5-9UVC].
236 Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
237 Id. at 1264–65.
238 See 888 F.3d 418, 421 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing PETA’s blog post which refers
to the litigation as the “Monkey Selfie” Case).
239 Id. at 420.
240 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004).
241 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259.
242 Naruto, 888 F.3d at 420.
720 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:689
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has consistently concluded that corpora-
tions, another type of artificial entity, have freedom-of-expression rights similar to
those enjoyed by citizens.243 Importantly, the Court reasoned that corporations can
contribute to discourse in important ways, a consideration that was not present in the
animal-related cases. In First National Bank v. Bellotti, a 1978 case that dealt with
whether a Massachusetts law that limited corporations from taking part in discourse
was constitutional, the Court concluded that, “[i]f the speakers here were not cor-
porations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech.
It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is
no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individ-
ual.”244 In the same passage, the Court reasoned “[t]he inherent worth of the speech
in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity
of its source.”245 The Court, in striking down the law, overturned the state’s highest
court’s ruling to uphold the law and limit corporations’ speech rights.246 The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s ruling, which was in many ways similar to
the reasoning found in the animal rights cases, explained, “It seems clear to us that
a corporation does not have the same First Amendment rights to free speech as those
of a natural person . . . .”247
In 2010, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded its conclusions from
Bellotti in Citizens United v. FEC.248 Justice Anthony Kennedy, in writing the
opinion for a deeply divided Court, explained that, “on certain topics corporations
may possess valuable expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors
or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected
officials.”249 Crucially, “artificial intelligence” could easily be substituted for “[c]or-
porations” in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court.250 In his concurring opinion
in the same case, Justice Scalia explained that the First Amendment was “written in
terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any cate-
gory of speaker.”251 His conclusion that the courts should not concern themselves
with who is speaking provides further support for corporate-speech-based protections
for AI communicators. Using this line of precedents from the Court, the potential
AI communicators have to benefit public discourse and their ability to act as speak-
ers, despite their fundamental lack of human characteristics, could be enough for the
Court to justify treating them similarly to citizens in First Amendment cases.
243 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
244 435 U.S. at 777.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 767.
247 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E. 2d 1262, 1270 (Mass. 1977).
248 558 U.S. at 340 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784).
249 Id. at 364.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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B. AI Speech Rights in Europe
Much like the American court system, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have not squarely addressed the
rights of AI communicators.252 Several ECJ applications have made passing refer-
ences to algorithms since the early 2000s, but the nature of such tools and stronger,
higher-functioning programs, have not been central or controlling in any of the
instances, particularly in regard to freedom of expression as it is outlined in article
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).253 The most notable dis-
cussion of algorithms came in Google Spain v. AEPD in 2014, which involved a
challenge put forth by the nation’s data protection agency against Google’s practice of
gathering information from those who conduct searches using its services.254 Ulti-
mately, the Court found that Google must, under parts of a few different sections of
European Parliament law and the ECHR, fulfill requests made by individuals to
remove information that appears about them when their name is searched.255 The ad-
vocate general’s opinion devoted a few different passages to the nature of the al-
gorithms that are involved in Google’s search engine.256 The advocate general wrote,
“Google’s search engine’s crawler function, called ‘googlebot’, crawls on the internet
constantly and systematically and, advancing from one source web page to another
on the basis of hyperlinks between the pages, requests the visited sites to send to it a
copy of the visited page.”257 As with the United States cases, the judgment and the opin-
ion were not focused on the nature of AI communicators. They were instead focused
on the “right to be forgotten,” which gained substantial attention after this decision.258
While the courts have not directly considered the rights of AI communicators,
the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament voted in January 2017 to
urge the European Commission to create legislation that explicitly recognizes that
“robots’ autonomy raises the question of their nature in the light of the existing legal
categories—of whether they should be regarded as natural persons, legal persons,
animals or objects—or whether a new category should be created.”259 The sweeping
report also raised questions about liability for physical injuries caused by robots, the
252 Searches for “artificial intelligence,” “bot,” “chatbot,” “AI,” “robot,” and other key words
did not return any relevant applications on the European Court of Human Rights’ case search
website: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int [https://perma.cc/65ZS-XXGQ].
253 ECHR, supra note 139, art. 10(1).
254 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Pretección de Datos (AEPD),
2014 E.C.R. 317.
255 Id. at 21.
256 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen ¶¶ 72–75, Google Spain, SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317.
257 Id. ¶ 73.
258 Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at 8–9.
259 Draft Report with Recommendation to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robot-
ics, at 5, 2015/2103(INL) (May 31, 2016), http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document
/JURI-PR-582443_EN.pdf?redirect [https://perma.cc/Y5C8-L9U7].
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potential impact the technologies will have on the workforce, and copyright and
data-ownership concerns.260 Importantly, the report further recognized that AI should
be regulated based on its impact upon human rights and that, “increasing communi-
cation and interaction with robots have the potential to profoundly impact physical
and moral relations in our society.”261 Though the report balanced substantial concerns
about the impact and influence of AI communicators with recognitions that they can
also be a benefit to society,262 it did not convey the types of understandings in the
American corporate-speech cases, in which the Supreme Court rationalized its de-
cision to extend protections to artificial entities, in this case corporations, because
they could contribute meaningful information to democratic discourse.263 Ultimately,
the European Parliament has created a robotics committee, which continues to in-
vestigate legal, ethical, and commercial concerns as they relate to the development
and incorporation of AI into citizens’ lives.264
The ECtHR has not been silent, however, regarding corporate speech. Precedents
from this court extend similar protections to non-human communicators as compared
to the American cases, but the legal questions that led to such applications arose
from substantially different circumstances. While United States corporate-speech
cases generally arose from campaign finance law and political speech questions,265
European decisions have primarily dealt with the nature of for-profit media compa-
nies. In Autronic AG v. Switzerland in 1990, a broadcast television company applied
for the rights to rebroadcast content from a Russian television satellite.266 A Swiss
agency rejected the company’s request and, ultimately, its appeal reached the ECtHR
as an article 10 concern.267 The court ruled in favor of the corporation, reasoning,
“[N]either Autronic AG’s legal status as a limited company nor the fact that its
activities were commercial nor the intrinsic nature of freedom of expression can
deprive Autronic AG of the protection of Article 10.”268 Crucially, in the same pas-
sage, the court explained that article 10 “applies to ‘everyone’, whether natural or
legal persons. . . . Article 10[ ] applies not only to the content of information but also
to the means of transmission or reception since any restriction imposed on the means
necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information.”269 A year
earlier, the court came to a similar decision in a case that involved a retail-oriented
260 Id. at 3–4.
261 Id. at 22.
262 Id. at 16.
263 See supra Section III.A.2.
264 See Robotics, COMM. ON LEGAL AFFAIRS, EUR. PARL. COMMS. (July 13, 2017), http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/juri/robotics.html?tab=Background [https://perma
.cc/SS79-AXEN].
265 See supra Section III.A.2.
266 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
267 Id. at 15.
268 Id. at 17.
269 Id.
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print publication based in Germany.270 In the face of a government-imposed injunc-
tion against further publication, the company argued that its article 10 rights were
violated.271 The government contended that the publication was a for-profit institu-
tion, not a news organization, and thus could not claim the restraint on publication
was an article 10 matter.272 The Court found, “The applicants did not deny that they
defended the interests of the specialised retail trade. . . . To restrict the freedom of
expression to news items of a political or cultural nature would result in depriving
a large proportion of the press of any protection.”273 Thus, the court constructed a
similar line of reasoning in this case as the American Supreme Court did in Citizens
United v. FEC274 and other corporate-speech-related cases.275 The judges reasoned
that to limit this organization’s rights because it was not a traditional news organiza-
tion would endanger the rights of journalists.276 Chief Justice John Roberts opened
his concurring opinion in Citizens United with the similar concern that letting the
campaign finance laws in question stand would “empower the Government to
prohibit newspapers from running editorials or opinion pieces supporting or oppos-
ing candidates for office, so long as the newspapers were owned by corporations.”277
Thus, when it comes to these cases, the two legal systems share a common allow-
ance for one particular “artificial legal entit[y]”—corporations, which receive freedom-
of-expression rights that have historically only otherwise been associated with human
communicators.278 While the corporate-speech-rights precedents are not identical,
the two court systems communicated understandings that such non-human speakers
should be protected because they contribute to discourse.279 Also, neither system has
substantially considered questions that surround the rights of AI communicators.
The crucial difference, however, is that the European Parliament has moved forward
with a document—however limited in legislative power it might be—that recognizes
many concerns and is beginning a dialogue regarding how to approach the challenges
that, as Web 4.0 arrives, will likely substantially affect discourse within society.280
270 Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany, 165, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1–2 (1989), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57648 [https://perma.cc/YR94-LTW6].
271 Id. at 11.
272 See id. at 12.
273 Id.
274 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
275 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
276 Markt Intern Verlag GmbH, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12.
277 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 373 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
278 Id. at 390 (Scalia, J., concurring).
279 Compare Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 312 (majority opinion), and First Nat’l Bank, 435
U.S. at 766, with Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990) at 17, http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57630 [https://perma.cc/E2QK-MKDJ], and Markt Intern Verlag
GmbH, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12.
280 See Draft Report with Recommendation to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on
Robotics, supra note 259.
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C. International Treaties and Non-human Entities
While the European Parliament has taken steps toward understanding the grow-
ing influence of AI communicators on democratic discourse, neither it nor other
governing bodies related with the European Union or the United States have created
laws, guidelines, directives, or other tools regarding how communicators and jurists
should understand the questions that surround the extent to which freedom of ex-
pression protections should be extended to AI communicators. As with the preceding
sections, in the absence of direct statements regarding such questions, this Section
examines the extent to which existent covenants, many of which have been signed
by the United States and European nations, outline how such rights for non-human
entities might be understood. Importantly, while many European nations’ constitu-
tions have allowances for international law built into their rights and protections,281
the U.S. Constitution includes no such expectation. The “Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany,” for example, proscribes “[t]he general rules of international
law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws
and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.”282
Similarly, the French and Spanish constitutions outline the role of international law
in the nation’s society.283
Thus, while the U.S. and European nations have signed and ratified or voted for
the United Nations’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),284 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD),285 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),286
these documents are far more likely to influence European courts’ decisions than
those in the U.S.287 The U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain in 2004,
for example, emphasized that the UDHR, though it “does bind the United States as
281 See, e.g., 1958 CONST. arts. 52–55 (Fr.); GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic Law], art. 25 (Ger.), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de
/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0141 [https://perma.cc/KH37-B696]; Constitucíón Española,
B.O.E. nn. 93–96, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
282 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law], art. 25.
283 See 1958 CONST. arts. 52–55; C.E. B.O.E. nn. 93–96, Dec. 29, 1978.
284 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [herein-
after UDHR].
285 G.A. Res. 2106 (xx), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter CERD].
286 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16,
1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
287 See Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic
Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 HOW.
L.J. 571, 586–90 (1997); Christopher Witteman, Information Freedom, A Constitutional Value
for the 21st Century, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 172–73 (2013); Terry D.
Johnson, Note, Unbridled Discretion and Color Consciousness: Violating International Human
Rights in the United States Criminal Justice System, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 231, 245 (2003).
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a matter of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express
understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations
enforceable in the federal courts.”288 Four years later, in Medellin v. Texas, the Court
repeated that, absent congressional direction regarding international law, claims
based on non-domestic covenants and agreements will not be compelling.289 Despite
this theme, however, the international covenants provide important perspectives re-
garding the potential scope and limitations of freedom of expression for non-human
entities on global levels.
1. Limited Room for Human Rights for Non-human Entities
All four of these documents explicitly and specifically focus on human rights.
As one scholar indicated, “[A]ll thirty articles of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights are predicated on the individual as the subject of human rights.”290
The preamble of the ICCPR, for example, states that the document focuses on “the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,” characterizing
them as “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”291 Similarly,
CERD emphasizes “all human beings are equal before the law.”292 Alternatively, the
documents do not use wording such as “entities” or “artificial persons,” which might
cause confusion about whether the promised rights extend to AI or other non-human
actors. Despite this theme, courts’ interpretations of the ECHR have created some
limited openings for non-human entities, primarily in the form of corporations, to
receive the promised protections.293 Article 10 explains that “[e]veryone has the right
to freedom of expression.”294 Its wording, at the outset, is nearly the same as the
UDHR and ICCPR’s article 19 and CERD’s article 5.295 Unlike the others, however,
the ECHR continues by allowing nations to require licensing for broadcast, televi-
sion, and cinema “enterprises.”296 As indicated with the Autronic AG297 and Markt
Intern Verlag GMBH298 cases, this aspect of article 10 has led to support in the
288 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004).
289 554 U.S. 759, 760 (2008) (per curiam).
290 Anna Yeatman, Who Is the Subject of Human Rights?, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
1498, 1505 (2000); see also UDHR, supra note 284, arts. 1–30.
291 ICCPR, supra note 286, at preamble.
292 CERD, supra note 285, at preamble.
293 See supra Section III.B.
294 ECHR, supra note 139, art. 10(1).
295 See ICCPR, supra note 286, art. 19; CERD, supra note 285, art. 5; UDHR, supra note
284, art. 19.
296 ECHR, supra note 139, art. 10(1); see also Peter Oliver, Companies and Their Funda-
mental Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 64 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 661, 677 (2015).
297 Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-57630 [https://perma.cc/E2QK-MKDJ].
298 Markt Intern Verlag GmbH v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57648 [https://perma.cc/YR94-LTW6].
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courts for corporate speech protections.299 The ECtHR has also extended article
8–based privacy protections to corporations.300 Article 8 ensures that “[e]veryone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”301
In Société Colas Est v. France and Niemietz v. Germany, the court interpreted article
8 as extending beyond individual citizens’ homes to businesses.302 In Société Colas
Est, a 2002 judgment that dealt with French officials’ raids of businesses during a
corruption investigation, the court reasoned that “it has previously held, the word
‘domicile’ (in the French version of Article 8) has a broader connotation than the word
‘home’ and may extend, for example, to a professional person’s office.”303 Perhaps
more importantly, in the ensuing paragraph, the court explained that the ECHR “is a
living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.”304
Finally, article 1 of Protocol I, which was added shortly after the initial ECHR doc-
ument was drafted, indicates that “[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.”305 Such a statement opens the door for non-
human entities to be classified as a “legal person,” and to therefore receive rights.
Importantly, the preceding examples identify instances where the wording found
in the ECHR left room for the courts to interpret otherwise human-focused rights as ex-
tending to non-human entities. None of these instances dealt with AI communicators.
Also, the other three documents’ statements regarding human rights include little, if
any, indication that any such protections, particularly in regard to freedom of expres-
sion, should be extended to AI communicators.306 As sociologist Anna Yeatman con-
cluded in her analysis of human rights treaties and covenants, AI may deserve some
form of rights, but “these will not be human rights, but the rights of such entities.”307
While this is one possible conclusion, the inherent interaction between humans and
AI communicators within societal discourse makes the international human rights
documents an important contributor to questions regarding free expression safe-
guards for AI.
2. Balancing Public Need and Free Expression Rights
The international covenants provide significant support for lawmakers and
different nations’ courts to curtail the ability of AI communicators to take part in
299 See supra Section III.B.
300 ECHR, supra note 139, art. 8.
301 Id.
302 Société Colas Est v. France, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 131, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng
?i=001-60431 [https://perma.cc/62HG-WKEG]; Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1992), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57887 [https://perma.cc/G7CW-J94J].
303 Société Colas Est, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14–15.
304 Id. at 15.
305 ECHR, supra note 139, art. 1 (emphasis added).
306 See generally ICCPR, supra note 286; CERD, supra note 285; UDHR, supra note 284.
307 Yeatman, supra note 290, at 1510.
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public discourse, particularly when these non-human entities put forth unpopular
ideas. Crucially, this theme turns on the substantially different constructions of
freedom of expression in the United States and within the European nations. These
different interpretations are reflected within the international treaties, which, as
previously indicated, are substantially more aligned with traditional European legal
understandings.308 The documents all include relatively strong statements regarding
the importance of freedom of expression,309 which, on the surface makes them similar
to the First Amendment freedoms that are outlined in the Bill of Rights.310 Impor-
tantly, however, the international documents generally include caveats that indicate
that such expression must be done responsibly and respectfully. Article 19 of the
ICCPR, for example, notes that “[e]veryone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference.”311 The third paragraph of the Article, however, indicates that
the right to free expression “carries with it special duties and responsibilities” and “it
may therefore be subject to certain restrictions.”312 Article 19 of the UDHR also
safeguards free expression, but article 29 indicates that “[e]veryone has duties to the
community” and that everyone must have “respect for the rights and freedoms of
others.”313 The passage continues by explaining that morality, public order, and societal
welfare are crucial goals to democratic society.314 These passages in the UDHR are
mirrored in the other documents, which generally, in sections that are separate from
where freedom of expression is outlined, include proscriptions against racist, im-
moral, or other communication that is deemed unhealthy to democratic society.315
CERD outlines the expectation that “all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or . . . against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic
origin” must be criminalized.316 The ICCPR explains that freedom of expression can
be limited “[f]or the protection of national security or of public order[ ], or of public
health or morals.”317 Article 10 of the ECHR includes similar concerns.318 It ensures
that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression. . . . without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers.”319 This passage, however, is followed
308 See generally ECHR, supra note 139; ICCPR, supra note 286; CERD, supra note 285;
UDHR, supra note 284.
309 ECHR, supra note 139, art. 10(1); ICCPR, supra note 286, art. 19; CERD, supra note
285, art. 5; UDHR, supra note 284, art. 19.
310 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
311 ICCPR, supra note 286, art. 19(1).
312 Id. art. 19(3).
313 UDHR, supra note 284, arts. 19, 29.
314 Id. art. 29(2).
315 See CERD, supra note 285, art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 286, art. 20(2); ECHR, supra
note 139, art. 10.
316 CERD, supra note 285, art. 4.
317 ICCPR, supra note 286, art. 19(3)(b).
318 See ECHR, supra note 139, art. 10.
319 Id. art. 10(1).
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by expectations that citizens have “duties and responsibilities” regarding “formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as . . . are necessary in a democratic society.”320
Interpretations of the First Amendment generally do not include any parallels
in this regard. Instead, as it is perhaps most concisely expressed in Texas v. Johnson,
a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court case in which justices struck down a law that criminalized
flag-burning, the government generally cannot, in keeping with the First Amend-
ment, make content-based restrictions on expression.321 Justice William Brennan
characterized the “bedrock principle” of the First Amendment as “the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.”322 Years earlier, in a defamation case, Justice Lewis
Powell provided a similar interpretation by invoking the marketplace concept.323 He
concluded, “Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”324 The Court
has upheld and expanded upon these rulings in more recent cases that involved actions
and ideas that the international covenants almost certainly sought to discourage. In
particular, the Court in 2011 upheld Westboro Baptist Church’s right to protest using
messages such as “God Hates Fags” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.”325 Eight
years earlier, the Court struck down a state law that criminalized cross burning, de-
spite the practice’s long history in the United States as a tool to threaten and intimi-
date a group of people because of their race.326 The deeply divided Court allowed
that cross burning with the intent to intimidate a certain group could be criminalized,
but the practice in general could not be.327 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in writing
for the Court, reasoned, “It may be true that a cross burning, even at a political rally,
arouses a sense of anger or hatred among the vast majority of citizens who see a
burning cross. But this sense of anger or hatred is not sufficient to ban all cross
burnings.”328 Such rulings provide a substantially different approach to limitations
on expression, particularly as they are outlined in international covenants and how
European courts have interpreted them.
European efforts to limit the types of speech that were at the heart of U.S. cases
such as the Westboro Baptist and cross-burning decisions have led to struggles
regarding how to both safeguard expression while still limiting immoral, unhealthy,
or racist ideas. In Mouvement Raëlien Suisse, the details of which are discussed in
320 Id. art. 10(2).
321 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
322 Id. at 414.
323 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 322, 339–40 (1974).
324 Id.
325 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011).
326 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343–44 (2003).
327 Id. at 366.
328 Id.
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Part II, the ECtHR rationalized its decision to uphold Swiss authorities’ rights to halt
an organization’s poster—not because of its content, but because of the organiza-
tion’s ideas.329 The court agreed that the poster did not include anything “unlawful
or likely to offend the general public,”330 but found that the local authorities had
wide latitude to pursue “the legitimate aims of the prevention of crime, the protec-
tion of health and morals, and the protection of the rights of others.”331 The court
indicated that the content of the group’s website could offend “the religious beliefs
of certain persons” and, later in its reasoning, that the concept of an ideal genetic
society “might offend the democratic and anti-discriminatory beliefs” on which
democratic society is based.332 In Delfi AS,333 the court rationalized its decision to
hold the service responsible for the comments users posted via its message boards
by concluding a balance must be struck between freedom of expression and irre-
sponsible communication.334 The court reasoned that “the case concerns the ‘duties
and responsibilities’ of Internet news portals,” as outlined in article 10, section 2,
when users “engage in clearly unlawful speech, which infringes the personality rights
of others and amounts to hate speech and incitement to violence against them.”335
Ultimately, the court found that Delfi had not done enough to protect its audiences
and that its claims that its article 10 protections had been violated were not valid.336
A year later, the fourth section of the ECtHR faced a similar question regarding
the extent to which forum providers are liable for how their services are used in
MTE v. Hungary.337 Once again, the court sought to balance the free expression
rights of the forum holders with concerns regarding the falsity, offensiveness, and
reputational impact the ideas that were published might have.338 The court found that
third-party providers, such as the industry self-regulating body and the for-profit
company involved in the case “assume duties and responsibilities.”339 Ultimately,
the court concluded that Hungarian courts had limited the third party providers’ rights
when they held them liable for the content that was published on their forums.340
329 See supra Section II.C; see also Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 2012-IV Eur.
Ct. H.R. 385, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 [https://perma.cc/27NM-XN9U].
330 Id.
331 Id. at 391.
332 Id. at 394–95.
333 Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-12
6635 [https://perma.cc/8U5J-5KVG].
334 Id. at 345 (quoting Declaration on Freedom of Communication on the Internet, Council
of Europe, May 28, 2003).
335 Id. at 372.
336 Id. at 388.
337 Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete v. Hungary, App. No. 22947/13, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 7 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-160314 [https://perma.cc/83D8-NWQL].
338 Id. at 3.
339 Id. at 14–15.
340 Id. at 21–22.
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While the court in MTE sided with free expression, it still emphasized that commu-
nicators are responsible for conveying ideas that are moral and beneficial to so-
ciety.341 Such concerns generally have had no place in free expression cases in the
United States. Finally, in 2013 the same ECtHR upheld a British administrator’s
decision to reject for broadcast an animal rights group’s advertisement.342 The court
in Animal Defenders International v. United Kingdom reasoned that it must balance
the NGO’s rights with the nation’s ability to “mould its own democratic vision.”343
The court explained that it was required “to balance, on the one hand, the applicant
NGO’s right to impart information and ideas of general interest . . . with, on the other,
the authorities’ desire to protect the democratic debate and process from distortion.”344
Beyond these balancing efforts, the court in these judgments consistently com-
municated that it understood the government as the keeper of the public debate.345
It also conveyed that it conceptualized the goal of the ECHR and similar efforts as
creating a pluralist society.346 The state-as-caretaker role was evident in Mouvement
Raëlien Suisse, where the court acknowledged, and ultimately upheld, the officials’
concern that the State “did not wish its name to be associated with certain non-majority
but lawful ideas.”347 Similarly, this concern was central to the Animal Defenders judg-
ment, where the court reasoned that individual nations, because of its knowledge of
“societies and their needs . . . are best placed to assess the particular difficulties in
safeguarding the democratic order in their State.”348 In several cases, the govern-
ment’s role as a steward for public debate manifests itself within the “pressing social
need” approach, which judges attributed to article 10, section 2.349 The court indi-
cated that if the limitation on expression was found to be a “pressing social need,” it
could be upheld.350 This was evident in Hertel v. Switzerland, a 1997 case that involved
a journal article that made claims that damaged the appliance industry.351 The Court
concluded that restraining the author from communicating his ideas did not repre-
sent “pressing social need.”352 Similarly, in Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, a
341 Id. at 22.
342 See Animal Defs. Int’l v. United Kingdom, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, http://hudoc.echr
.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244 [https://perma.cc/X6W3-7RBX].
343 Id. at 235.
344 Id.
345 See id. at 234.
346 See id. at 235.
347 Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 392, http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 [https://perma.cc/27NM-XN9U].
348 Animal Defs. Int’l, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 235.
349 See, e.g., Mouvement Raëlien Suisse, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 403; Steel and Morris v.
United Kingdom, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R.19, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68224 [https://
perma.cc/634C-PHH9]; Hertel v. Switzerland, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. 31 (1998), http://hudoc.echr
.coe.int/eng?i=001-59366 [https://perma.cc/Y6VT-84UF].
350 See Mouvement Raëlien Suisse, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 403.
351 Hertel, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3–4.
352 Id. at 31–35.
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2005 chamber judgment regarding whether a Greenpeace pamphlet defamed the
McDonald’s Corporation, the Court turned to the “pressing social need” standard in re-
jecting the fast-food giant’s claims.353 Such a standard, along with the other efforts
to balance social concerns with freedom of expression protections have led to substan-
tially different lines of precedent between the U.S. and European legal systems.
Ultimately, the legal systems’ differing approaches to interpreting freedom of
expression, particularly in light of the international covenants, create the potential
for markedly different frameworks regarding emerging questions about the freedom
of expression rights of AI communicators. The European system, which prioritizes
cultural pluralism and seeks to balance free expression with public concerns, such
as morality and health, includes numerous existing safeguards against many of the
potentials harms that AI entities can inflict on democratic discourse. The U.S.
system, which pays little attention to the international documents and is far more
oriented toward a relatively unfettered marketplace-of-ideas approach, has fewer
existing tools for limiting AI expression.
IV. AN ARTIFICIAL MARKETPLACE
The growing presence of AI entities within the global, instantaneous discourses
that take place in virtual communities around the world raises fundamental questions
about how the freedom of expression rights of an entirely new form of communicator
should be understood. Alongside such entities’ increasing presence within our dis-
course, the nature of our own communication has changed. Within the virtual en-
vironments where AI entities are flourishing, people are forming weaker ties, producing
less nuanced messages, and grouping into fragmented, like-minded, and intentional
communities.354 These shifts in human discourse cannot be ignored when considering
how the rights of non-human communicators should be conceptualized, since these
changes have made it easier for AI communicators to take part in human discourse.
While the U.S. and European court systems diverge in fundamental and impor-
tant ways regarding how they have interpreted safeguards for freedom of expression,
both models are likely to struggle as AI communicators become more complex, and
as they introduce novel problems into legal systems that have yet to squarely address
the rights of such entities, even in their more basic forms. U.S. Supreme Court prece-
dents, which have remained closely associated with the Enlightenment-oriented
marketplace model for nearly a century, provide few avenues for lawmakers and
jurists to limit the potentially harmful effects AI entities might have on democratic
discourse without limiting human free-expression rights.355 At the same time,
353 Steel and Morris, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 36–39.
354 See, e.g., SHIRKY, supra note 49, at 71–75; SUNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 44; Iyengar &
Hahn, supra note 51, at 20–21.
355 See, e.g., Massaro & Norton, supra note 5, at 1173–74; Schroeder, supra note 66, at
383–84, 401–02.
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however, the marketplace model cannot—in its current form—account for the power
of AI entities to use their fundamentally non-human qualities to artificially boost
some ideas while drowning out the ability of human ideas to organically compete in
the marketplace. They can, essentially create marketplaces where only one product,
or truth, is available for consideration.
The U.S. court system could turn to the animal rights cases in seeking a way to
delineate protected human expression from that of non-humans. The outcomes in
these cases indicated that when non-human actors—animals—claimed rights that
have traditionally only been made available to humans, they were consistently found
to lack standing.356 They therefore were not afforded human-like protections. These
cases, however, fail to account for the potential contributions AI entities can make
to discourse. AI communicators are simply, by their nature, not like animals. Animals
generally struggle to communicate messages that are created by others and are not
capable of creating meaningful messages that contribute ideas to the flow of infor-
mation. Some AI communicators can not only repeat messages from human actors,
but also construct ideas and make them available to citizens.357 These capabilities
should only advance over time.
Another option is to approach AI entities as being more like corporations, which
have found substantial First Amendment protection in the U.S. and strong freedom
of expression support in European courts.358 Corporate-speech protections have been
substantially supported because of their abilities, despite being artificial entities, to
contribute to democratic discourse.359 A blanket decision to protect all AI actors’
free-expression rights, based on the corporate-speech precedents, however, would
open the door to crippling market failure in the marketplace of ideas. With no power
to limit AI actors’ messages, these communicators could drown out human ideas,
build artificial appearances that some ideas are more accepted than others, and do
much of this work while remaining indistinguishable from human communicators
online. Thus, a more nuanced approach is needed.
The international covenants that have guided European lawmakers and jurists, and
the precedents that courts have put forth as a result of them, have provided a far wider
spectrum of tools for managing the impact of AI entities on discourse. European
356 See, e.g., Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 426 (9th Cir. 2018); Tilikum v. Sea World Parks
& Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1264–65 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386
F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004); Miles v. City Council, 710 F.2d 1542, 1544 (11th Cir. 1983).
357 See Massaro & Norton, supra note 5, at 1171–72 (“Such computer speakers also are
increasingly self-directed or ‘autonomous’—which is to say, the computer generates content
further afield from human direction.”).
358 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 766 (1978); Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 115 (1990),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57630 [https://perma.cc/E2QK-MKDJ]; Markt Intern Verlag
GmbH v. Germany, 165 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 11–12 (1989), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=
001-57648 [https://perma.cc/YR94-LTW6].
359 See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
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court decisions have balanced freedom of expression protections with concerns re-
garding morality, public health, and the preservation of a healthy democratic society.360
They have also expressed consistent concerns for safeguarding a pluralist and tolerant
society.361 By doing so, lawmakers and courts have constructed more diverse under-
standings of freedom of expression. These approaches provide some promising
building blocks regarding how certain types of AI communication can be limited
while human expression remains protected. The difficulty with this approach, how-
ever, is that it becomes likely that individual nations will create a patchwork of
varyingly rigid restrictions upon AI communicators’ expression. Such a patchwork
would, in all likelihood, be relatively ineffective in addressing a challenge that is
essentially borderless. Furthermore, the ECtHR’s relatively recent efforts to rule on
freedom-of-expression concerns have been based more on case-by-case, balancing
approaches, rather than constructing a clear precedential line that would allow
lawmakers and jurists in individual nations to understand how the ECHR’s rights
are to be interpreted.362 Indeed, the Court’s careful, deferential approach toward
individual nations’ legal concerns, while understandable, works against the broader
effort to remedy this global concern.
A potential avenue for addressing this global concern, however, would be to
revise the fundamental assumptions of the marketplace model to emphasize the
evolution of truth as the result of discourse rather than as a competition between
truth and falsity.363 In other words, the foundational aspects of the marketplace
rationale could be shifted from a focus on protecting the discovery of truth to
safeguarding the development of truth. By constructing and applying a model that
incorporates more discursive assumptions about truth, rather than the more tradi-
tional Enlightenment-founded building blocks, the theory helps to create a dividing
line between AI that contribute to the development of truth and AI that mislead,
create or convey falsity, and simply artificially overwhelm the marketplace. This
foundational revision to the theory would create a stronger rationale for protecting
the flow of information, rather than the competition of ideas, which in this case
would mean safeguarding the potential contributions that AI entities can make to
discourse.364 Thus, lawmakers could regulate AI-based expression that does not
contribute or damage the flow of information, but the First Amendment and article
360 See Defi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 345 (quoting Declaration on Freedom
of Communication on the Internet, Council of Europe, May 28, 2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-126635 [https://perma.cc/DXF3-VFT6]; Animal Defs. Int’l v. United Kingdom,
2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 234, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244 [https://perma.cc
/X6W3-7RBX]; Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 [https://perma.cc/27NM-XN9U].
361 See, e.g., Animal Defs. Int’l, 2013-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 234–35.
362 See, e.g., id. at 235.
363 See DEWEY, supra note 179, at 158; HABERMAS, supra note 179, at 3–7; HABERMAS,
supra note 182, at 21.
364 See Schroeder, supra note 66, at 428–30.
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10 of the ECHR would safeguard AI communicators’ expression on the assumption
that halting their contributions would damage discourse. Such an approach aligns
with the wording found in other international covenants. Article 19 of the ICCPR
emphasizes that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers.”365 The ICCPR’s wording substantially draws from the UDHR,
which also highlights that people have a right to both express and receive informa-
tion.366 Protecting AI that contribute to the flow of information aligns with the right-
to-receive aspects of the articles.
Such a shift in the theory’s assumptions regarding truth would also align more
with Justice Holmes’s more pragmatic approach to the nature of truth. Justice
Holmes, according to his legal and personal writings, did not believe in absolute,
objective truth.367 Instead, he understood truth as being conditional, an approach
that, while it does not line up entirely with discursive thought, appears to be more
amenable to it than the more Enlightenment-related assumptions that the market-
place approach has come to be associated with.368 Of course, even if a more discur-
sive approach is used, such an approach still leaves unresolved the crucial question
of who will decide which AI-based expression contributes to the flow of information
and the eventual emergence of truth and which does not. This is not a simple question.
The European courts, along with the international covenants, have established pre-
cedents regarding expression that is harmful to individuals or society. These stan-
dards were particularly on display in the Mouvement Raëlien Suisse, Delfi, and
Animal Defenders judgments.369 While the reasoning in these judgments does not
provide a clear precedent regarding the extent to which certain types of harmful
expression can be limited, the rulings, along with the covenants, have at least broken
trail in that direction. Similar approaches could be employed for AI communicators,
365 ICCPR, supra note 286, art. 19(2).
366 See id.; see also UDHR, supra note 284, art. 19.
367 See HOLMES, supra note 110, at 107; Holmes, supra note 113, at 40–41.
368 While Justice Holmes and Dewey never met in person, they read each other’s work. Jus-
tice Holmes commented to a friend that in Dewey’s Experience & Virtue, he “read sentences
that I didn’t understand, for his style is horrid, but I thought that I never anywhere had read a
philosophical work that felt our Universe so deeply and so widely.” Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Nina Gray (Jan. 2, 1927) (on file with Harvard Law School Digital Suite), http://
library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/42882378/11 [https://perma.cc/M49U
-3MYN]. At the time of his death in 1935, Justice Holmes had three of Dewey’s books on
his shelf. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Digital Suite (on file with Harvard Law School
Library Digital Suite).
369 Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 345 (quoting Declaration on Freedom of
Communication on the Internet, Council of Europe, May 28, 2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
/eng?i=001-126635 [https://perma.cc/DXF3-VFT6]; Animal Defs. Int’l v. United Kingdom,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 234–35, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244 [https://perma.cc/X6W3
-7RBX]; Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 391, http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165 [https://perma.cc/27NM-XN9U].
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which would provide a framework for limiting the false and misleading information
that such communicators often interject into discourse.
In the U.S., however, the courts would have to take the step of giving AI com-
municators fewer rights than humans. The revised, more discursive marketplace
approach, provides a theoretical rationale for such a change. Of course, this line of
thinking would go against the precedents from the corporate-speech cases, which pro-
vided strong support for protecting artificial entities’ First Amendment rights.370 Of
course, corporations were protected because they can contribute to discourse.371 They
are also collections of citizens.372 The courts could reason that allowing the regulation
of AI entities that damage the flow of information does not conflict with the corporate-
speech precedents, or the First Amendment more generally, because they are doing
quite the opposite regarding the Supreme Court’s rationale from cases such as
Bellotti and Citizens United.373 These types of AI are not contributing to discourse and
the development of truth that comes with it. Thus, AI, in this scenario, would receive
lesser freedom-of-expression protections than human communicators, but would still
receive limited, conditional safeguards. Such an approach, one that emphasizes pro-
tecting the development of truth, rather than its discovery, aligns with the more
discursive marketplace approach. If courts rationalize freedom of expression protections
as safeguards for the development of truth, dividing AI communicators between those
that contribute to discourse and those that do not becomes a more achievable task.
370 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
371 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364.
372 Jared Schroeder, Marketplace Theory in the Age of AI Communications, 17 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 22, 58 (2018).
373 See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
